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ABSTRACT 
Essays on the Economics of Sponsored Research 
concerns the regulation of a firm conducting R&D under 
contract with a sponsor. Chapter 1 surveys the rich 
economics and policy literature concerned with R&D con-
tracting. Prior to Balbien and Wilde (1980), the chief 
weakness of the literature was in the analysis of dy-
namic contracting incentives and the implications of 
information assymetry between a researcher and sponsor. 
Chapter 2 is an empirical essay describing R&D con-
tracting by the Department of Defense. Based on a sample 
of DOD R&D contract data from 1979, several hypothesis 
are tested with multivariate statistics. These hypo-
theses concern the choice of generic contract type by 
sponsors, the effect of competition, and the performance 
of various contractual forms. 
The third chapter analyzes a dynamic model of in-
crementally funded research which is descriptive in nature 
and not subject to direct econometric estimation. Never-
theless, it provides valuable insight into a firm's 
behavior in revealing research progress to a sponsor, 
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through targets set over a sequence of research periods. 
Chapter 4's essay focuses on the influence of various 
types of research assistance on a firm's internal invest-
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A LITERATURE SURVEY 
Central themesofeconomic research on R&D have been 
1) the relationships between growth in productivity, in-
novation, and aggregate R&D expenditures, and 2) the 
extent to which market failures bring about underinvest-
ment in research. Duringthe 1960's, an impressive body 
of empirical research indicated that technical change 
associated with R&D accounted for much of the observed 
increase in gross output per worker during the 20th cen-
tury. More recently, the work of Grilliches (1980) 
indicates that a firm's rate of productivity increase 
is directly related to the amount it has spent on R&D. 
With a positive relationship between productivity 
growth and R&D established at both the micro and macro 
level, the focus of ecnomists has shifted towards address-
ing the question of whether a market economy will under-
invest or over-invest in R&D relative to some theoreti-
cal optimum. Turning to the adequacy of the nation's 
investment in research and development, Mansfield wrote 
in 1970: 
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"There is too little evidence to support a 
very confident judgment as to whether or not _ 
we are underinvesting in certain types of 
research and development. However, practically 
all of the studies addressed to this question 
seem to conclude with varying degrees of con-
fidence that we may be underinvesting in par-
ticular types of R&D in the civilian sector of 
the economy where estimated marginal returns 
seem very high." (p.33) 
For example, one study of 37 commercial innovations 
found that the estimated median social rate of return 
on investment in R&D was 70 percent and the median 
private rate was 25 percent. (Mansfield,l977) Even 
the private rate of return is high, suggesting under-
investment in R&D by industry. 
Four sources of market failures associated with R&D 
are summarized by Noll (1975) in a state of the art survey. 
These sources include: 
1) Indivisibility: the minimum efficient scale 
of R&D operations can be sufficiently large 
that the market for a particular class of 
ideas cannot be competitive; 
2) Inappropriability: innovators are unable to 
capture the full economic value made possible 
by their innovations; 
3) Indirect failures: if a good must be produced 
outside a competitive market, the institutions 
created to bring this about may lead to inef-
ficiencies in the advancement of knowledge with 
respect to production and distribution of the 
. good; 
4) Uncertainty: the economic uses of the technical 
ideas that emanate from R&D activities are not 
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known in advance so that the search for inno-
vation is a gamble. (Noll, p. 3) 
Although recognizing the sources of market failures, 
Noll cautions that existing public policies (e.g., tax 
laws and research sponsorship) do on balance promote R&D 
relative to other investments, at least in industries not 
subject to public utility regulation. Thus, even if free 
markets under-invest in research, this effect may be off-
set by other factors including current levels of government 
intervention. 
The reasons often cited for government sponsorship 
of research and development are closely relat.ed to the mar-
ket failure hypothesis. In the defense area, Scherer and 
Peck (1962) observed that after World War I, industry, 
with few exceptions, did not transform research concepts 
into workable hardware until demand for a specific weapon 
system arose. They attributed this industry anomaly to an 
inverse relationship between the costs of a military re-
search and development effort and the certainty with which 
R&D results could be foreseen and capitalized. Thus, for 
private firms it was usually too costly to develop a highly 
specialized weapon, the demand for which might never be 
realized. 
Since private risk capital has seldom been invested 
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in weapons research beyond initial feasibility demonstra-
tions, the Department of Defense (DOD) funds development, 
testing, and evaluation of new weapon systems through R&D 
contracts with private firms. (DOD also funds basic and 
applied research conducted at government owned research 
laboratories.) In the case of private contractors, initial 
contract terms, e.g., weapon specifications, often serve 
as a baseline for a dynamic quasi-regulatory relationship 
between a research firm and its agency sponsor. 
Once a prototype or test model is considered suffici-
ently developed, production designs satisfying DOD's speci-
fications and receiving congressional approval are purchased, 
often by negotiation, but sometimes through competitive 
biddings. For example, DOD contract data analyzed by the 
Comptroller General (1979) shows that less than 27 percent 
of the nearly 50 billion dollars in contract awards in 1977 
were based on price competition. Contracts values at 31 
billion dollars were awarded to sole source contractors. 
Of course, federal sponsorship of research and develop-
ment is not limited to development of military hardware. 
For example, DOD funds a significant proportion of all in-
dustrial and academic research. These expenditures are 
directed at improving the nation's technological base by 
adding to human capital and providing advances in basic 
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TABLE 1 
CONDUCT OF R&D BY MAJOR DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES* 
(In millions of dollars) 
Department or Agency 
Defense-Miltary functions-
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
Energy 
Health and Human Services 
(National Institutes of Health) 
National Science Foundation 
Agriculture 





Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
Education 
Veterans Administration 



























































1 Includes the Departments of Housing and Urban Development, Justice, Treasury and State; the Tennessee 
Valley Authority, the Agency for International Development, the Institute for Science and Technological 
Cooperation, the Smithsonian Institution, the Corps of Engineers, the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Consumer Product Safety Commission, the Federal 
Communications Commission, the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, the Federal Trade 
Commission, the Library of Congress, the U.S. Office of Personnel Management, and funds appropriated 
to the President. 
* Source: "Small Business Guide to Federal R&D," National Science Foundation (August 1980):34. 
6 
and applied research that maintains America's technological 
edge over potential adversaries. Other agencies also 
invest in industrial, environmental and medical research. 
(See Table 1) For example, a General Accounting Office 
(GAO) report (1979) found that commercially directed R&D 
programs, funded by the Departments of Energy, 
Transportation and Health, grew in importance as a 
proportion of federal spending. The goal of these programs 
is the adoption and marketing by private firms of goods 
and services embodying the results of federally funded R&D. 
According to GAO, the government invests in 
commercially directed R&D because: 
"social returns are believed to be positive, but; 
perceived private returns are insufficient to 
justify the investments, and; uncertainty regarding 
commercial success makes todays payoff too low to 
justify the investment". (GAO, p. ii) 
Although the free market oriented R&D policies of 
the Reagan Administration may reverse the trend towards 
direct federal funding of commercially directed R&D, 
increased military expenditures are likely to translate 
into a steady growth in total federal spending on contract 
research. 
Four literatures are of central importance in 
formulating a theory of contract research. The first two, 
concerned with theoritical aspects of appropriability and 
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uncertainty, require extension to the environment of span-
sored research. A third literature which addresses in-
centives in agency affairs, is vital for integrating R&D 
models with an economic theory of contracts. A final 
body of research consists of policy oriented studies of 
R&D ~ontracting by DOD and other federal agencies. These 
empirical case studies provide a bridge between economic 
theory and reality. 
In research contracting, the opportunity to sell in-
formation is superimposed upon the production of innovation. 
Therefore, appropriability as an incentive for innovation 
takes on a new dimension. With respect to the effect of 
competition on appropriability and a firm's incentive to 
innovate, two contradictory propositions relevant to in-
ternally funded research projects are discussed by 
Rogerson (1980). 
In a contracting environment, the first proposition 
can be stated as follows: assuming that research progress 
is unobservable to a sponsor, (except through a firm's 
research reports) and a firm has market power, it should 
be more able to extract rents from the revelation or sale 
of research progress. Therefore, a less competitive con-
tracting environment encourages a contractor to pursue 
innovation because its research advances are more appropri-
able. 
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However once a single firm possesses an innovation, 
a sponsor may pay more for the revelation of research 
progress than if several firms have knowledge of an inno-
vation. Thus, an incentive to innovate derived from future 
market power may lead, expost to a slower dissemination 
of information. 
On the other hand, a competing proposition is that a 
monopolist might face less of an incentive to both inno-
vate and reveal research progress than if a rival firm 
is holding or pursuing a research contract with the spon-
sor. As a result, innovation may be maximized at an inter-
mediate level of competition, where some appropriability 
exists, but rivalry limits a firm's ability to fully ex-
ploit its research position. 
When a contractor's research progress is observable 
to a sponsor, the appropriability of a new innovation can 
depend on the terms governing ownership rights to new know-
ledge. Historically, almost all federally sponsored re-
search has been in the public domain (excluding defense 
R&D) •1 However,the trend in recent legislation and execu-
tive branch policy is towards granting the United States 
a free license but otherwise awarding inventors or their 
employers exclusive rights to the results of federally 
2 sponsored research. The hope is that a more generous 
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patent policy will encourage innovation by contractors 
and commercial application of government owned patents. 
This position is supported by presidential science ad-
visor Simon Ramo (Smith, 1980), who notes that in re-
turn for surrendering public rights the government 
would receive half the revenue from an innovation through 
the corporate income tax. 
Despite a recent shift in governrne~t policy toward 
a more generous patent policy, there is considerable con-
troversy in the economics literature with regard to the 
value of exc~usive patent rights as an incentive for in-
novation in research contracting. 
In theory, to .the extent that a firm's disclosure of 
proprietary and other information to a sponsor could com-
promise its technical position or result in the sponsor 
asserting property rights over commmercially useful inno-
vations, private f~rms are less likely to participate in 
3 sponsored research programs. 
However, a firm that holds a research contract 
has an incentive to limit observability of its research 
progress and thereby maximize its control over dissemina-
tion of information. This is the essence of a firm's sales 
strategy which has been neglected in much of the li.terature. 
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For example, a researcher may choose to temporarily 
withhold knowledge in order to sign a new contract with 
the sponsor when the current contract expires. (Balbi en 
and Wilde 1980) Alternatively, it may be in the firm's 
long term interest to completely capitalize commercially 
useful information developed at government expense by 
treating new knowledge as a trade secret. A decision 
to capitalize will depend on 1) the extent to which an 
innovation can be reverse engineered and 2) the likeli-
hood that other firms will claim the same innovation as 
th~ir own. 
One indication that capitalization occurs can be 
gleaned from a standard defense in patent encroachment 
suits against the United States. The federal government 
often argues that the relevant innovation was developed 
under a government grant or contract, but was not reported 
4 to the sponsor as required by federal law. In such a 
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case, the contractor forfeits all rights. 
Other evidence is also suggestive of capitalization. 
Historically, it is reported by Utterback and Murrary (1977) 
that . far fewer patents have resulted from defense or space 
supported R&D than from commercially funded R&D, and a 
far smaller proportion of those which have resulted from 
defense support have had any commercial application. This 
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suggests that either government sponsored research is 
less productive from a commercial standpoint, perhaps 
because of inefficiency and adverse selection of projects, 
or alternatively, firms participating in sponsored re-
search are more likely to prefer capitalization, i.e., 
industrial secrecy, to a public patent. To the extent that 
this latter argument is tr~e, a more generous patent and 
licensing policy may have a minimal impact on perceived 
levels of innovation. Moreover, policy makers may be un-
derestimating the benefits of existing intervention. 
Critics of exclusive patents, for example, Rubenstein 
(1980), add that in such high technology fields as elec-
tronics, the speed of entry, proprietary know-how, ongoing 
R&D, and other factors may mean much more than the posses-
sion of a patent. Rubenstein concludes that it is not 
clear that manipulation of the patent system as such will 
make a tremendous impact on the rate of innovation or the 
adoption and utilization of innovations from federally spon-
sored research. Noll (1975) notes that the patent system 
is costly to operate and may encourage wasteful effort to 
invent around an innovation. 
A study by Arthur D. Little (1963) found that in 
electronics, the two to five year delay between invention 
and receipt of patent is normal, and by the time the patent 
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is received, the cycle for a product is almost over. 
Utterback and Murray (1977) add that in electronics the 
mobility of engineers and scientists has led to tech-
nology being rapidly shared among firms and to rapid 
diffusion of innovations. These factors tend to reduce 
the value of exclusive patents as an incentive for inno-
vation in both contract and internally funded research. 
The second major literature relevant to a theory of 
R&D contracting is concerned with the impact of uncertainty 
on the behavior of firms and competitive markets. It is 
the nature of research work that the amount of progress 
that can be achieved over some contractual period is un-
certain. Nevertheless, economic theory provides the insight 
that uncertainty should not preclude firms from pursuing 
risky endeavors provided they have access to insurance. 6 
Unfortunately, .there are two reasons one would not 
expect a firm to be able to privately insure its internal 
R&D activities, or alternatively, insure its contractual 
research obligations to a sponsor. Difficulties arise be-
cause of both moral hazards and an unwillingness on the 
part of a researcher to share all information with a po-
tential insurer. A contractor whose potential gains and 
losses from a research project were fully insured might 
not have an incentive to succeed. Secondly, potential 
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insurers are likely to receive incomplete information on 
the research project, because otherwise they might have 
an opportunity to sell knowledge to others. As a result, 
the insurer's subjective uncertainty may dominate his 
lesser aversion to risk and result in no insurance being 
provided by the marketplace. 
The likely failure of insurance markets to develop 
in the research area has two important implications. 
First, less R&D (both contractual and internal) than is 
optimal may occur to the extent that owners of firms are 
risk averse and cannot self-insure through diversification, 
nor shift financial risk to potential sponsors. Secondly, 
a large firm participating in several research programs 
may conduct more research and accept greater financial 
risk on any one project, ceteris paribus, than several 
small firms. This assumes that organizational disecono-
mies, associated with bureaucratic structure, do not off-
set risk taking encouraged by diversification.
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The Princ~pal Agent Literature (Harris and Raviv 
(1976), Shavell (1979) and others) provides an analytical 
framework for studying the impact of risk and appropriability 
in simple contractual relationships between a research firm 
and sponsor. Most models assume that both parties to an 
agreement can observe the output of a single research or 
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production period. While this is a strong assumption for 
basic and applied research, observability may be ~ useful 
assumption for answering certain questions about highly 
visible hardware development programs. In addition, it 
is assumed that the firm can act to reduce the cost of 
making research progress, but this effort may not be mon-
itorable by the sponsor. For example, the firm could 
assign its brightest or alternatively its least imagina-
tive engineers and scientists to a project and pursue low 
risk research strategies that offer marginal payoffs to 
the sponsor. Another integral part of the model is that 
the final cost of achieving research goals is uncertain. 
Thus, a contractual commitment by a researcher to achieve 
a given level of progress for a fixed fee subjects a firm's 
future profits to considerable risk, e.g., larger than 
expected research costs and possible damage for breach. 
Nevertheless, one of Shavell's (1979) major results 
implies that if the researcher is risk neutral, a contract 
that pays a fixed fee conditional on a firm's success is 
optimal, providing both a maximum incentive for cost con-
. f . k 8 trol and an optimal allocat1on o · rls . 
When an agent is risk averse, but must accept fixed 
price contract terms in order to obtain the contract, a 
large premium will be demanded in the fixed fee to 
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compensate for the uncertainty in the firm's research 
costs. As a result, if the sponsor is the less risk 
averse of the two parties, both could be made better off 
if the sponsor insured the firm against cost growth by 
reimbursing some R&D costs, while paying a lower fixed 
fee that is conditional upon successful completion of the 
contract. Of course, if the principal insures the re-
searcher against all financial risk (e.g., by refunding 
all costs and paying a fixed fee independent of the outcome 
of its research), no incentive is provided for cost control 
and the accomplishment of research goals. 
In summary, there are two important results from the 
static Principal Agent Literature. First there is a 
tradeoff between incentive maintenance and optimal risk 
sharing. A second best contract must stike a balance 
between the two. The emphasis of one factor, risk shar-
ing, at the expense of another, incentives for cost con-
trol, carries with it the penalty of sharply higher con-
tract price per unit of research progress. Secondly, if 
the owner of a firm is risk averse, contract terms should 
require that a firm's profits depend to some extent on 
the outcome of its research, but the firm never bears all 
the risk. 
Other authors havealso contributed to the Principal 
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Agent Literature. In a revision of their earlier paper, 
Harris and Raviv (1978) recognized that even imperfect 
information about an agent's effort can make both parties 
to a contract better off. This may explain why cost 
accounting standards and audits of a firm's research 
costs are often incorporated into a negotiated contract 
price as crude indicators of cost control. However, one 
problem facing government research sponsors is that mon-
itoring research cost is in itself costly. Moreover, 
accounting audits tend to be out of phase with the track-
ing of a firm's research progress. This is because of . 
division of labor within the contracting organization and 
imperfect observation of research output and research costs 
as a project unfolds. 9 
Harris and Raviv also outlined the usefulness of 
dichotomous fee arrangements, (i.e., those which penalize 
the agent discontinuously when effort lies in an unaccept-
able region). Cummins (1973) obtained similar results 
when he showed that a modified contingent sharing ratio 
in providing both desirable risk sharing and marginal 
incentives for cost control. Finally, Lewis (1980) showed 
that lump sum bonus and penalty payments contingent on 
performance may be preferable to contracts in which an 
agent's reward depends continuously on observed performance. 
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This suggests that a research sponsor's threat toter-
minate a contract if observed performance falls below 
some threshhold may be a useful control strategy. 
Besides prescribing desirable contract terms for 
sponsored research, the Principal Agent Literature pro-
vides one theory to explain the observed behavior of 
firms holding government R&D contracts. As predicted 
in simple agency models, case studies of government 
research contracting indicate that cost reimbursement 
contracts let by the Department of Defense (DOD) and the 
National Aeronautic and Space Administration (NASA) have 
introduced incentive problems that may be reflected in 
observed cost growth. For example, in one sample of 
twelve aircraft and missile development projects spon-
sored by DOD (5, p. 429) the average ratio of actual to 
estimated cost was 3.2, and the average ratio of actual 
to estimated time was 1.4. Likewise, an unpublished re-
port by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(1981) examining a group of seventeen representative pro-
jects found that the average ratio of actual cost to planning 
estimates was 2.0 during the 1960's, 1.41 from 1970-74, 
and 1.39 between 1975-79. 
Interestingly, cost estima~ for civilian R&D planning 
have also proven inaccurate, especially when projects attempt 
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large technical advances. They may indicate that incen-
tive problems often associated with contracting by govern-
ment agencies apply to some extent to privately funded 
research projects. Alternatively, all researchers may 
be prone towards underestimating R&D costs. For example, 
in~ study involving a proprietary drug company, the average 
ratio of actual to estimated development costs was 2.1 and 
the average ratio of actual to estimated development time 
was 2.9.10 
Most studies of cost growth have concluded that high 
average cost ratios for R&D projects undertaken by govern-
ment agencies result from a combination of three factors: 
real "overrun" associated with inefficiency, biased es-
timation of initial project costs (because of technical 
uncertainty and adverse selection of optimists) , and im-
f . . b"dd" 11 proper use o compet1t1ve 1 1ng. 
Cost growth associated with overruns and schedule 
slippages in achieving research and development objectives 
have been encouraged by the attractiveness of the cash 
flow aspect of cost reimbursement contracts. Many policy 
makers have failed to recognize that "economic profits" 
may be more akin to accounting cash flow than accounting 
definitions of profit. 
For example, it is widely recognized in industry and 
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academics that when a government agency reimburses a com-
pany for overhead associated with a research cost -overrun, 
a contractor is encouraged to perform additional research 
in other areas, write new research proposals, and maintain 
. t . . h . 1 ff 12 excess capac1 y 1n 1ts tee n1ca sta . These invest-
ment activities tend to enhance a firm's future research 
opportunities and chances of survival in the unstable bus-
iness environment that characterizes the aerospace and 
defense industry. Perhaps, cost growth in one research 
project may also benefit firms in future negotiations with 
the same sponsor by empirically justifying a higher future 
contract price for similar work. 
However, Scherer (1971) notes that both government 
and industry often find cost plus administrative contract-
ing beneficial. Risk averse firms are insured against po-
tential financial losses associated with unexpected in-
creases in research cost. In addition, the government 
sponsor is spared the political heat associated with re-
d . 1 f . 1 . f. 
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war 1ng a c ever 1rm arge accountlng pro 1ts. 
Nevertheless, in the early 1960's Defense Secretary 
McNamara rebelled against what was perceived as wasteful 
and politically expedient cost plus fixed fee (CPFF) con-
tracting. As a result, DOD revised its procurement regu-
lations to encourage the use of so-called "incentive" 
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contracts. The government's objectives in using this 
new contract instrument was to improve efficiency -and 
raise industry profitability. The government hoped to 
redistribute the financial risk of a project through 
cost (profit) sharing when actual costs exceeded (were 
less than) t~rgeted costs, and raise targeted profit 
rates to reward firms for risk taking. (Scherer, 1971, 
p. 531) 
Incentive contracting can be described by the follow-
ing simple equation: Realized Profit = Target Profit + 
R (Target Cost - Actual Cost} , where R is the sharing 
ratio. In a CPFF contract, R=o. The government benefits 
from cost underruns, but pays all cost overruns. In a 
fixed price contract, R~l, so. that the firm has maximum 
incentive for cost control. Incentive contracts represent 
a compromise between CPFF and fixed price contract with R 
often taking on values between .2 and .35. (Scherer, 1971, 
p. 528) 
McNamara's policy did reduce the value of CPFF con-
tracts from thirty-seven percent of military prime contracts 
in 1961 to less than ten percent in 1965. In addition, in-
centive contracts, predominantly those with a linear shar-
ing of cost overruns and underruns, rose from fourteen per-
cent to thirty percent of total prime contracts' value, 
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while the value of firm fixed price contracts rose to 
fifty percent, up from thirty-two percent. (Merow, et al. , 
1976) 
However, most researchers have concluded that incen-
tive contracting during the 1960's had only marginal im-
pact on the growth in total contract price required to 
h . R b. . 14 ac 1eve government &D o Ject1ves. Nor did it restore 
defense industry profitability. (Scherer, 1971, p. 582) 
One explanation in the literature for the inability 
of incentive contracts to control cost growth is that policy 
makers did not recognize the motivation of firms and gov-
ernment contract officers to modify contract terms. At 
DOD, it is reported that costs, fees and R&D objectives 
were being frequently altered in renegotiations which often 
involved little competition. Thus, as R&D costs accumulated 
in a project, it is hypothesized that technical events and 
an absence of competition encouraged contract modifications. 
These contract changes often shifted financial risk away 
from a firm and towards the sponsor, so as to reflect new 
knowledge, unforeseen technical problems, premature optimism, 
and changes in contract objectives. However, these hypo-
theses concerning the factors influencing modifications 
have not been empirically tested (Merow, et al., 1976, pp. 
153-166) 
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Although risk sharing ratios between 0 and 1 seemed 
to have marginal influence on cost growth, Parker (1971), 
did find a strong relationship between cost growth and 
cost type, as opposed to fixed price contracts. However, 
this correlation was attributed to an allocation of pro-
jects to contract types according to prior expectations 
of uncertainty, rather than incentives for cost control 
inherent to fixed price terms. Perhaps fixed price con-
tract terms also provide the government with a slight ad-
vantage in future renegotiations. 
Scherer (1971) takes the macro viewpoint that contin-
uous renegotiation of incentive contract terms during the 
1960's was an indirect symptom of underlying defense and 
aerospace industry excess capacity rather than an exogen-
ous cause of cost growth. According to this theory, in-
tensive competition for programs forced firms to accept 
increasingly optimistic and unrealistic cost and technical 
targets. As a result, most incentive contracts ended in 
cost overruns accompanied by a failure to achieve initial 
specifications. (Scherer, 1971, p. 532) 
It should also be noted that McNamara's incentive 
contracting policies encouraged firms and government con-
tract officers to negotiate fixed price contracts and/or 
incentive provisions which presuppose ~ell-defined sets 
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of baseline specifications. As a result, when uncertainty 
dictated more general specifications, costly renegotiation 
of initial contract terms were required, often in a non-
competitive environment. 
The problems posed by after-the-fact modifications are 
not limited to R&D contracts let by DOD. A review of the 
Atomic Energy Commission's (AEC) prototype-reactor-develop-
ment program confirmed that contract modifications moti-
vated by unforeseen technical problems and industry per-
suasiveness enabled firms to circumvent risk sharing im-
posed on .·tbe researcher by initial contract terms. (Merow, 
et al., 1976. pp. 61-66) 
It is reported that where the AEC contracted for con-
struction of reactors, four out of five projects suffered 
major overruns in reactor costs and substantial project 
delays, regardless of contract type. (Merlow, et al., 1976, 
p. 64) Three out of five projects included cost-reimburse-
ment-type contracts, and two projects involved fixed price 
contracts. In all cases, initial contract terms were mod-
ified to reduce losses to the firms. 
Cummins (1973), in one of the most sophisticated econ-
·ometric studies of cost overruns, investigated the thesis 
that "overruns" are not necessarily inconsistent with 
efficiency, i.e., accomplishing contract objectives at the 
24 
lowest possible cost. 
Cummins analyzed 118 multi-million dollar army con-
tracts completed between 1965 and 1970. His theoretical 
model assumes that managers of firms have utility func-
tions favoring both high-current profits and high-final 
project costs, which may enhance a firm's future profit-
ability. Cummins' analysis leads to a simultaneous equa-
tion system between overrun and sharing ratio. First, 
initial risk sharing and then final overrun are determined 
by expected cost minimization by the government, and a 
two-stage utility maximization by the firm. In contrast, 
contract modifications are assumed to be the result of 
random, exogenous events. Cummins' major result is that 
the size of cost overruns and the target profit rate on a 
contract are not directly relevant to the objectives of the 
firm or government. One can vary both the percentage fee 
and target cost for a project, which changes the expected 
cost overrun, without changing the firm's profit or the 
final cost of the project to the government. 
One major problem in Cummins' thesis is the assumption 
that modifications are exogenous to the degree of risk 
sharing imposed on a firm. In addition, there is some 
conflict in the literature in regard to Cummins' assumption 
that the profit fee on an incentive contract is independent 
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of contractual risk assumed by the firm. This is counter 
to the assumptions made by Scherer. Nevertheless, Cummins' 
two-stage model was a major step towards a dynamic theory 
of R&D contracting. Like Scherer & Peck (1962), Curnrnons 
recognized that firms do not always minimize costs in pur-
suit of maximum profits on a given contract. He incorpor-
ated long-term profits implicitly into a model of contract 
selection and firm behavior. 
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FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER 1 
1. However, DOD retains royalty free use of these in-
ventions for military purposes. (See Title 10 Armed 
Services, U.S. Code 2273.) In addition, there are pro-
visions for government recoupment of the development 
cost of commercially valuable inventions that are 
"reduced to practice" under a DOD contract. 
1-2400.) 
(SEE ASPR 
2. For example, H.R. 6933 (Entitled: "To Amend The Patent 
and Trademark Laws") and submitted Harch 1980, was in 
the direction of a more generous patent policy. 
3. For a discussion of this issue from industry's per-
spective, see the following Aerospace Industries 
Association publications: "Risk Elements In Govern-
ment Contracting," mimeo, (1970), and also "Propri-
etary Data: An Essential Asset," in A Report To The 
Commission On Government Procurement (1970). 
4. Analysis was based on interviews with the NASA patent 
attorney Jon Trevansky (November 1980) and Navy Patent 
Officer Al Kwitneski (February 1981). Also see U.S. 
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Court of Claims S76, Reporters Against U.S. 
5. See Vorster clause, (30 USC 666), 15 USC 1395 (c), 
(1964 Supp V). 
6. For an excellent review of the literature see 
Burness, S., R. Cummings, and J. Quirk. 
"Speculative Behavior and the Operation of 
Competitive Markets Under Uncertainty: A Survey 
Article." Staff Paper 80-11, Montana State 
University (1980). 
7. For example, B. Klein argues that when well estab-
lished firms become large-scale, well organized 
bureaucracies, inadequate feedback from a "hidden 
foot" may reduce risk taking. See Klein, B.H. 
"The U.S. Productivity Slowdown and Its Relation 
to the Inflation Problem," Social Science Working 
Paper 286, California Institute of Technology (1979). 
8. The fact that government R and D contractors are 
strongly opposed to "fixed price" contracts for a 
development effort, provides evidence that the owners 
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or managers of these firms are very risk averse. 
For an industry perspective concerning contract 
selection, see "Types of Contracts and Their 
Selection," mimeo, Aerospace Industries Associat i on 
(July 1971). 
9. For example, DOD administrative instructions for 
contract officers note that: 
... Instead of working with estimates of future 
activity, the contracting team is soon working 
with imperfectly measured actual costs to date 
plus estimates to complete. The actuals are 
made more difficult to work with intelligently 
by the imprecision of cost accounting and the 
difficulty of measuring ongoing work in progress. 
Taken from ASPM No. 1, (September 1975). 
10. Cited in !'·1ansfield, E. "How Economists See R and D." 
Harvard Business Review (November-December 1981) . 
11. Reference 18 suggests that ~n incompatibility between 
competitive bidding (as a means of selecting a 
contractor and determining price) and cost 
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reimbursement contracting has contributed to 
observed cost growth in NASA sponsored projects. 
A. Herman has empirically shown that underestimates 
of R and D cost would be increasingly likely for 
more complex and/or technologically advanced systems. 
!'Choice Among Strategies For System Acquisition," 
mimeo, The Rand Corporation (March 1972). In 
reference 19, Balbien observed that adverse 
selection of optimists within a R and D organization 
may contribute to biased cost estimation. 
12. Confidential interviews were conducted with contract 
officers who had worked both as R and D sponsors and 
industry negotiators. Their statements about 
incentives for cost growth were consistent with early 
arguments made by Scherer and Peck in Reference 5, 
and later Cummins in Reference 16 and 23. 
13. A state of the art discussion appears in Reference 20. 
One aspect of cost reimbursement contracting that 
appears to have been missed in the literature is that 
it may enable firms to receive a higher after tax 
price for their R and D services v1hile DOD pays a lower 
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before tax price. Thus, a federal agency may be able 
to raid the treasury, in part through the tax system 
rather than appropriations. 
14. For example, R. Perry concludes that despite the 
contracting reforms of the 1960's, typical programs 
continued to exhibit an average cost growth of about 
40 percent, a schedule slip of 15 percent, and a 
final system performance that would deviate by 30 
or 40 percent from initial specifications. Perry, 
R., G. K. Smith, A. Harman, S. Henrichsen "System 
Acquisition Strategies," The Rand Corporation (1971) :v. 
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AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF R&D CONTRACTI~G BY 
THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 2 describes the results of an empirical study 
of R&D contracting at the Department of Defense. It focuses 
on the microeconomic factors that influence a sponsor and a 
firm's choice of contract type, and the magnitude of both 
initial and modified contract price. 
There are two unique aspects of this study. First, 
large quantities of information concerning 8,000 DOD R&D 
contracts, active during fiscal year 1979, are extracted 
directly from a government data system used to monitor 
the contracting activities of ~11 federal agencies. Second, 
multivariate statistics are used to analyze new contracts 
and contract changes over a relatively short period of time, 
twelve to twenty-four months. 
IIG A THEORETIC FRAMEWORK 
Definitions of R&D 
Basic and applied research involves the pursuit of new 
knowledge. Contracts usually call for experimental work 
directed at tangible goals. At the end of a research period 
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a contractor is often required to provide an end report or 
written document describing its research findings. In 
contrast, development contracts may require that a 
contractor design and develop a new product or process, 
or demonstrate progress towards cost reduction. Contract 
terms may also require delivery of · a prototype or test 
model satisfying a set of specifications. 
An additional distinction between research and 
product development is that in the former, the researcher's 
subjective probability of success at some endeavor can be 
represented by a random draw from a distribution over 
possible states of nature, the outcome of which is less 
sensitive to a · researcher's perseverence. As a result, 
moral hazard is less problematic so that risk sharing, at 
least in the context of a researcher's contractual 
obligations to achieve a specified level of progress, would 
be conterproductive. Therefore, one would expect to observe 
few incentive and fixed price research contracts structured 
around a researcher's commitment to achieve research progress. 
However, in development, uncertainty tends to be focused 
on the costs required to achieve more or less feasible technical 
goals, i.e., there is greater uncertainty that a process or 
product will eventually work, but less is known about 
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research costs. Furthermore, in development the probability 
that a researcher can achieve planned milestones during a 
research period is more sensitive to the researcher's 
effort. As a result, in development contracts, the classic 
tradeoff between optimal risk sharing and the maintenance 
of incentives should play a greater role in the selection 
of initial contract terms than in basic research. 
Intertemporal Incentives 
While clear distinctions are often drawn between 
Research and Development, governmentpurchases of new 
products and services for the public sector, or as an 
incentive to industry, sometimes link an early research 
phase with product development, and production. Support 
of basic and applied research through grants and contracts 
provides a foundation for subsequent contracts requiring 
conceptual, preliminary, and then engineering design 
followed by the building of a prototype. A successful 
prototype or demonstration of cost reduction may give a 
firm an opportunity to obtain more profitable production 
contracts from a government agency or enter a new commer-
cial market. The former is particularly true for DOD, which 
is the first and often the only customer for a new weapon 
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technology that results from its sponsored research. 
The programmatic context of many R&D contracts and the 
future business opportunities they provide overshadow 
contractual incentives to perform to the satisfaction of a 
research sponsor. Moreover these intertemporal incentives 
exist independently of any particular contract form. 
Yet, several factors may limit the effectiveness 
of intertemporal contract incentives. Government appropriations 
are on an annual basis so that the continuity of federally 
sponsored R&D programs is an important source of uncertainty 
1 to a contractor. Furthermore several years can pass between 
research, development, and application of an innovation. 2 
Also, the firm that performs the initial research work may 
not be the same firm that builds a prototype. As a result, 
high risk-adjusted discount rates can reduce the importance 
of a firm's future rewards. Finally, a sponsor's difficulty 
in measuring a firm's actual research progress over relatively 
short contract periods, against that of rival firms, can 
result in a research sponsor unknowingly rewarding the fir·rn 
that is the most optimistic, rather than the most 
. . 3 1nnovat1ve. 
While an ongoing research program, perhaps structured 
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around multi-year contracting might address the problems 
outlined above, a firm's opportunity to develop a sole 
source position may cause problems. It is often argued 
in the literature that a firm seeking to become a new 
supplier or sole source may risk a short term loss by 
offering an initial contract price that is below the 
expected cost of reaching a sponsor's research objectives. 
This phenomenon is called a "buyin." 4 
A firm has an incentive to bid low or set extremely 
challenging research goals in order to win a technical or 
price competition, or encourage government sponsorship 
of a marginal research project. A company hopes that its 
current contract will be extended, modified, or result in 
an entirely new contract negotiated in a more favorable 
environment. 
In summary, there are economic i .ncentives for 
performance in R&D contracts that are associated with 
future business opportunities, but external to the specific 
terms of a firm's current contract. However, these 
economic incentives are less effective when there are 
long time periods between research inputs and observable 
product innovation, there is uncertainty surrounding future 
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contracts, and a firm has an opportunity to develop a 
monopoly position in an R&D program. 
Contrac·t Award 
Although intertemporal incentives may on balance provide 
a positive impact, government R&D sponsors have historically 
negotiated contract terms that focus on a firm's near term 
performance incentives. At DOD the contracting process often 
begins with the selection of a generic contract type followed 
by a solicitation of potential sources. Then the selection 
of a contractor, its research obligations, (e.g., to design 
a prototype, or supply a level of R&D effort), and the 
initial contract price it is to receive are determined, 
either by a competition between two or more firms, or 
alternatively through bilateral negotiations with a sponsor. 
Competitive theory su9gests that when a technical or 
price competition is used to select among similar R&D 
proposals, the attractiveness of an R&D contract to a firm 
is likely to be reduced relative to a bilaterally negotiated 
contract. This is because external competition for initial 
contract awards improves the relative negotiating position 
of the sponsor. As a resul~ the winning firm may be forced 
to accept risk sharing and price terms that make it indifferent 
between success and failure in obtaining a contract. 
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However, once a firm is awarded a contract, it enters 
a subrnarket made up of contractors conducting R&D in 
similar areas for the same sponsor. In a subrnarket firms 
who already have R and D contracts compete for extensions 
or renewals of those contracts. In addition contractors 
working for a budget constrained sponsor may compete for 
favorable changes in contract terms necessitated by new 
information not available when a particular contract was 
negotiated. 
The existence of submarkets raises important research 
issues. For example, what is the possible impact of internal 
competition on a sponsor's initial selection of contract type? 
Perhaps the positive incentive effects of internal competition 
may provide contracting parties with an opportunity to avoid 
the use of explicit riSk sharing clauses that are costly to 
negotiate and less acceptable to a risk averse firm. A 
sponsor who can observe a firm's initial research position 
and future research effort, only imperfectly and at considerable 
cost, is compelled to structure the contract so as to explicitly 
shift financial risk towards the researcher. Incentives for 
performance are thereby maintained. However, risk sharing 
contracts may have the effect of discouraging risky, but 
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profitable research by the contractor, and encouraging 
modification of contract terres in the post award period. 
By substituting internal competition for explicit risk 
sharing, a sponsor can absorb greater financial risk (and 
thereby encourage a firm to conduct research), while 
competition for extensions, renewals, and contract 
changes maintains incentives for an efficient research 
effort. 
Two alternative hypotheses are that the government's 
selection of contract type may be more or less 
institutionalized by a set of standard operating procedures, 
e.g., the Armed Ser~ices Procurement Regula~ions (ASPR), 
so that the opportunity to substitute the invisible hand 
for legal instruments is not acted upon. Secondly, different 
research projects may not be perceived as close enough 
substitutes, relative to the sponsor's objectives, to make 
budgetary competition an effective means of shifting risk. 
Contract Modifications 
Gov·ernment procurement regulations define a contract 
modification as: 
"any unilateral or bilateral written alteration 
in the specifications, delivery point, rate of 
delivery, contract period, price, quantity or 
other provision of an existing contract that 
obligates or deobligates funds." (~_SPM No.1: 9Al) 
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While this definition covers a broad array of contract 
changes, there is a common element. ~odifications involve 
bilateral negotiations directed at revising initial contract 
terms, including price, in light of new information revealed 
by one or both parties since the contract was awarded. These 
renegotiations occur within a submarket, where other 
contractors may likewise be engaged in renegotiations with 
the sponsor, for renewals, extensions, and changes in contract 
terms. 
Analogous to its impact on a new contract, internal 
competition should provide a sponsor with more information 
and possible research alternatives. As a result, each 
contractor's project may become more expendable. These 
factors may moderate price changes awarded in renegotiations 
with an individual firm. An alternative possibility is that 
submarkets may lack depth so that each contract is administered 
in more or less of a vacuum. This might occur, again, because 
the sponsor does not view its research projects as viable 
substitutes or because of fragmented power within a sponsoring 
agency. 
III. DATA 
In November 1969, Congress created a Commission on 
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Government Procurement. Its purpose was to study and 
recommend reforms that would promote efficiency, economy, 
and effectiveness 5 in contracting by the federal government. 
One of the commission's major recommendations was the 
establishment of a central office of federal procurement 
policy that would implement a standardized system of 
collection and dissemination of statistics on contracting. 
As a result, in 1978, a Federal Procurement Date System 
6 (FPDS) was created by the Office of Management and Budget. 
The FPDS was originally designed and operated by the 
Department of Defense. It reports on contracting by all 
executive agencies of the federal government entering into 
contracts with funds appropriated by Congress. Nevertheless, 
several types of contractual agreements are excluded from 
the FPDS and should be mentioned. Exclusions include: 
1. Grants and subsidies, etc.; 
2. Nonappropriated fund activities, e.g., the 
Import Export Bank of the United States; 
3. Transactions between different federal agencies; 
4. Contracts let by intergovernmental organizations; 
5. The research work of international bodies in which 
the United States is a participant, e.g., the 
the United Nati'ons; 
6. Subcontracts let by private corporations which 
hold federal prime contracts. 7 
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The unit of analysis in the FPDS is called a contract 
action. There are two general categories: the award 
of a new contract and a modification of an existing contract. 
A government contracting office that awards a new 
contract or negotiates a modification for more than ten 
thousand dollars is required to file a Contract Action 
Report which is the raw input data for the FPDS. These 
reports provide a standardized format for recording the 
history of a contract. 
Each Contract Action Report contains twenty-seven 
questions or data entries. Some of the important data 
entries utilized in this empirical study are discussed 
below along with a brief explanation of their role in the 
analysis. 
Contract Type 
The Federal Procurement Data System provides for eleven 
categories. However, an analysis of the full sample of 
R&D contracts indicates that the qualitative results in this 
study are unaffected by the pooling of similar contract 
types into three major categories, cost plus fixed fee, 
incentive contracts, and fixed price contracts. 8 These 
contract classifications are ordered to reflect a firm's 
increasing responsiblity to control cost, and therefore 
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the underlying allocation of risk between the sponsor 
and research firm. 
Product Service Codes 
This data entry defines the service rendered or product 
being developed, including optional information about the 
9 stage of research and development. Product Service Codes 
are matched with SIC codes for related industries in order 
to estimate the number of firms - in an industry. In addition, 
product service codes are used to count the number of 
contractors in a submarket and thereby measure the extent 
of internal competition associated with a given contract. 
Industry size is used in the analysis as a proxy variable 
for external competition, i.e., the number of firms potentially 
bidding on a contract. 
Extent of Competit~on in Negotiation 
This entry indicates whether a contract follows a 
research competition between several contractors, is 
negotiated with a sole source, or is awarded to the 
best of two or more research proposals. As a result the 
extent of competition in negotiation can also provide a 
measure of external competition for a contract award. 
Contrac·t Identification Number 
These codes are used to identify and merge data 
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from different Contract Action Reports that are associated 
with the same contract or research project. For example, 
if a single contract is modified ten times over the 
reporting period, ten separate Contract .Actio:1 Reports 
' would be entered into the FPDS. By matching contract 
identification numbers, 17,000 DOD contract actions could 
be reduced to a twenty-four month history of 8,000 separate 
contracts. 
IV. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
Bivariate 
Table 2 displays a crosstabulation of data for 5,700 
new R&D contracts reported during fiscal year 1979. The 
data is sorted on one dimension by contract type, and on 
a second dimension by sponsoring agency. All agencies 
exclusive of DOD and NASA are collapsed into a third 
category because of small sample size. The table suggests 
general similarity, but some differences in research 
contracting among federal agencies. The null hypothesis 
of independence between agency and contract type is 
rejected at the one percent level. 
Table 3 shows the same sample of data crosstabulated 
by four stages of R&D, and by defense and non-defense 
TABLE 2 
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sponsorship. The small sample of non-defense contracts 
reflects the fact that NASA does not report a stage of 
R&D most applicable to its projects. Research stage 
is an optional item in the FPDS. The higher frequency 
of development contracts observed at DOD is consistent 
with that agency's unique role as both a research sponsor 
and the principal consumer of products developed at the 
government's expense. In Table 3, the null hypothesis of 
inde~endence between stage of research and sponsor is also 
rejected at the one percent level. 
Next 1 Table 4 illustrates the simple statistical 
association between the choice of contract type and stage 
of R&D applicable to a particular project. The cross-
tabulation again _reveals that most R&D contracts are 
either CPFF or fixed price. Incentive contracts are 
relatively rare for R&D. However, as predicted by agency 
theory, when incentive contracts are used, they are 
relatively more likely to be selected for development work 
than are CPFF contracts. Yet, when comparing CPFF and 
fixed price contracts, the same relationship, while in the 
predicted direction, is far less pronounced. This suggests 
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that other factors, not controlled for in a simple 
bivariate analysis are influencing the selection of 
contract type. In Table 4, the Chi Square test suggests 
rejection of the null hypothesis of independence between 
contract selection and stage of research. 
The bivariate analysis illustrated in Tables 2-4, 
which is representative of much of the policy literature 
concerned with R&D contracting, is of limited explanatory 
value. For example, the defense contracting literature 
discussed in Chapter 1 suggests that incentive contracts 
are associated with hardware development projects and are 
also plagued by cost overruns and changes in contract 
terms. But are modifications motivated by the use of 
incentive contracts, the stage of R&D, or other factors 
in the procurement environment perhaps correlated with 
these variables? In the next section multivariate 
regression analysis, N-Chotomous Probit, and a Tobit 
model are used to analyze factors influencing the 
selection of contract type, contract price, and the price 
of contract modifications. These powerful statistical tools 
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A Multi-variate Approach 
While a number of important factors 
may influence the choice of contract type, Table 3 
indicates that sixty-eight percent of all DOD R&D 
contracts reported to the FPDS during 1979 were CPFF. As 
hypothesized earlier, a substitution of internal 
competition for contractual risk sharing may contribute 
to the widespread use of a contract, that in a legal sense, 
shifts most financial risk to the government. 
Table 5 presents the results of a multi-variate 
analysis of contract selection at DOD, using a N-Chotomous 
Probit model developed by McKelvey and Zavonia (1975). 
A crucial statistical assumption for the application of 
Probit analysis is that the dependent variable be a choice 
among K ordered categories, where K is greater than two. 
Thus, the stepwise progression from a fixed price contract 
to a CPFF contract must represent an underlying continuum 
with respect to risk assumption or a firm's responsibility 
to control costs. 10 
The analysis reported in Table 5 supports the hypothesis 
that internal competition is used as a substitute for 
contractual risk sharing. The positive and statistically 
significant coefficient for the nu~ber of firms in a 
submarket, means that the more firms a sponsor has under 
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TABLE 5 








Internal Competition .002** 
(3.42) 
Agency's Residual Budget -.00001** 
(-3.49) 
Industry Size -.09* 
(-2.46) 






























Fixed Price = 1 
Incentive = 2 
Cost Plus 
Fixed Fee = 3 
N = 1432 
2 R = .21 
% Predicted = 72 
Rank Order 
Correlation = .36 
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contract in a particular research area, the more likely 
a new contractor is to receive favorable contract terms 
with respect to contractual risk bearing, all other factors 
being equal. 
Several other factors also appear to have a statistically 
significant effect on the selection of contract type. The 
positive and significant coefficient for the variable measuring 
the length of a firm's research period may reflect increasing 
uncertainty about project cost and success, which forces a 
firm to forecast further into the future. As uncertainty 
increases, the government tends to bear a larger share of the 
contract risk. 
The size of the research budget to be spent in a 
submarket may affect contract selection. The Residual Budget 
variable is defined as the sum of the dollar value of contracts 
in a submarket axcluding the contract associated with the 
value of the dependent variable, i.e., contract type.
11 
The 
negative and significant coefficient indicates that an increase 
in a sponsor's research budget tends to force firms to accept 
increased risk through written contract terms. This may be 
explained by either greater monopsony power resting with 
the sponsor or closer agency scrutiny of large budget areas. 
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In contrast, when contracts are awarded in the absence 
of a technical or pricing competition between research 
proposals, Table 5 suggests that contractors are able to 
shift the risk of cost growth back towards the government. 
Two variables measure the extent of competition in a contract 
award. They are "Industry Size" and "Noncompetitively 
Negotiated. 11 The latter takes on a value of zero when a 
contract is awarded through competition, and 1.0 when a 
contract is awarded in the· absence of competition. As 
discussed earlier, Industry Size is a proxy variable for 
the number of firms making research proposals. Both 
indicators of competition in the award of a contract are 
significant and have the expected signs. 
Organizational factors may also influence the selection 
of contract type. The FPD'S records the branch of the Armed 
Services that let the contracts analyzed in Table 5. The 
dummy variables identifying Army and Navy contracts indicate 
the contracting preferences of these two services relative 
to a reference category, the Air Force. Both the Army 
and Navy appear less likely to use fixed price contracts than 
the Air Force. However, this organizational effect is 
statistically significant only for the Army. 
A final factor influencing the choice of contract 
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type, and by implication contractual risk assumption by 
the firm, is the stage of R&D associated with a project. 
Dummy variables taking on values of zero and one depending 
on which of three phases of development can best be 
associated with a contract, are labeled in ascending order 
according to proximity to final product or process design. 
The dummy variable identifying basic research contracts 
has been omitted so that the coefficients for the other 
R&D variables indicate their effect on contract selection 
relative to that of a basic research contract. The sign 
and relative magnitude of the development coefficients 
indicate that the more development oriented is a project, 
the more likely it is that a fixed price or incentive 
contract will be used. 
One potential objection to the - model specification 
in Table 5 is the omission of a right-hand variable 
explicitly measuring a sponsor's expectations about 
future modifications in contract terms. However, if the 
observed frequency of changes for each contract (or their 
monetary value) , are included as right-hand variables in 
the Probit model, potential similtanaeity between contract 
selection and realized contract changes would invalidate 
the statistical results. 
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A defense of the specification chosen by the author 
rests on two premises. First a sponsor's expectations 
concerning future contract changes is considered indirectly 
through other variables included in the model, e.g., the 
length of the period covered by the contract and the 
stage of research. Secondly, the analysis presented in 
the next section suggests that, ceteris parabus, all types 
of R&D contracts are equally subject to economically 
significant modifications in contract terms. 
Having addressed the selection of contract type, 
one can turn to the factors that influence intitial 
contract price and the price of subsequent modifications 
or revisions of contract terms. An immediate dilemma 
arises. What is the unit of output for R&D, i.e., what 
normalization can be used to determine price consistently 
across different contracts? Ideally, one could observe 
and then measure research milestones in a consistent way 
across projects, and thereby develop both an ex ante and 
realized price to the sponsor for innovation. However, 
interpretable data concerning research milestones is 
difficult to acquire. 
Therefore, the multi-variate analysis of contract 
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prici~g that appears in Tables 6 and 7 is based on a 
normalization by research period, which is measured in 
months. This means that the independent variables that 
influence the dependent variable (the dollar amount 
obligated in a contract action) are multiplied by the 
length of the research period inherent to a contract. 
In a statistical sense, one is estimating coefficients for 
economic factors that affect the flow of revenue to an 
R&D contractor. 
Two other issues need to be addressed before 
discussing the results in Tables 6 and 7. The statistical 
model shown in Table 6 assumes that the contract type 
appropriate for an R&D project is selected prior to the 
negotiation of a contract price. Therefore the three 
contract types can be introduced as control or dummy 
variables which may or may not influence the initial flow 
of revenue to a contractor. Similtanaeity between price 
and other contract terms would be a more of a problem 
in an alternative specification where contract prices 
are regressed on negotiated risk sharing ratios and other 
variables associated with a sample of contracts. Such a 
specification is beyond the scope of this study. 
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Likewise any similtanaeity between initial contract 
price and the selection of other contract terms should 
not violate the statistical assumptions of a multivariate 
model designed to explain the variation in revenue from 
contract modifications. Contract revisions occur after 
the determination of contract terms. Therefore contract 
type and initial price can be treated as pre-determined 
factors that possibly affect the future price of contract 
modifications. 
Finally, while multiple regression is a helpful tool 
for studying the flow of revenue on new contracts, linear 
regression may not be useful for analyzing a history of 
contract modifications. In a sample of new contracts, 
observations of the dependent variable, contract price, 
take on positive dollar values. In contrast, one may 
observe zero valued contract changes because some 
contracts are completed without modifications. Other 
contract actions result in price changes valued under 
ten ·thousand dollars, which are not recorded by the 
government's procurement data system. 
When a significant nurrber of observations concerning 
a dependent variable are censored from a positive valued 
sample, application of a linear regression model will result 
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in biases in the estimated coefficients and a violation 
of the assumptions that underly statistical tests of 
significance. According to the FPDS, less than fifty 
percent of the contracts analyzed in this study were 
awarded positive price changes over a twelve month period. 
One way to address the statistical problems associated 
with the censored observation of the dependent variable is 
to truncate the sample of contracts and only analyze positive 
values of contract changes. However this approachwould 
throw away valuable information and possibly bias the 
results in a systematic direction. 
To address the objections to the use of a regression 
model discussed above, a Tobit or Censored Regression Model, 
(Tobin, 1958), is used for the analysis of two samples of 
contract changes reported in Table 7. With the exception 
of dummy variables, the maximum likelihood estimates 
reported for the Tobit Model can be interpreted in the 
same way as regression coefficients. However, they are 
estimated with the intercept term forced through the origin. 
In contrasts, the regression results reported in Table 6 
include estimates of constant terms. As a result, a co-
efficient for a dummy variable reported in Table 6, represents 
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TABLE 6 




Research Period .56** 
(8.51) 
Internal Competition -.20** 
(-5.1) 
Agency's Residual Budget .0014** 
( 8. 5) 
Industry Size -.119** 
(-3.74) 
Non-competitively Negotiated 7.99 
(1.2) 
Fellows Research Competition 17.12* 
(2.04) 
Development 1 -7.53 
(-1.4) 
Development 2 -1.47 
(-.24) 




Cost Plus Fixed Fee 33.53 
(.66) 




N = 2109 
R2 = .13 
F = 29.3 
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TABLE 7 
FACTORS INFLUENCING REVENUE FLOW FROM MODIFICATIONS 
Independent First 
Variables Modification 
Research period .066 
(1.82) 
Initial contract term -.101** 
(-3.3) 
Internal Competition -.017* 
(-2.19) 
Industry Size -.0076* 
(-2.08) 
Non-competitively negotiated .03 





Follows Research Competition 
Contract Type 
Incentive 
Cost Plus Fixed Fee 
Fixed Price 
Initial Dollar Award 
Agency's Residual Budget 
Significance Level 
*5% **1% 
( • 0 4) 
-2.0 
(- .. 012) 
-1.6 
(- .. 001) 
-3.6 
(- .. 02) 
2 .. 5 
( .. 01) 
3.02** 
(2 .. 78) 
7.5 
(. 04) 
4 .. 95 







N = 1380 
















( .. 07) 
3.16 












( -2. 0 5) 
.00005* 
(2.05) 
N = 1587 
Nonlimits = 288 
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the difference between the intercept term of the identified 
group and a reference category. Suppression of the constant 
term in Table 7 implies that the coefficients of the dummy 
variables represent the intercept term for the identified 
category. 
The principle result that can be derived from Tables 
6 and 7 is that both internal and external competition between 
firms working in similar industries or product areas 
seems to reduce the flow of revenue to a contractor below 
what it would be in a less competitive environment. More 
importantly, this result seems to apply to both new contract 
awards and subsequent contract changes. 
However, the role played by the other independent 
variables ·in determining the price of contract actions as 
reported in Tables 6 and 7, appears to differ among new 
contracts and subsequent contract changes. 
The positive and significant coefficients for research 
period, illustrated in Tables 6 and 7, imply that the longer 
the time period covered by either a contract or modification, 
the larger is the flow of revenue to a firm. Perhaps long 
term research efforts are insulated from competitive 
pressures, that would otherwise reduce a contractor's 
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revenue. 
In contrast, Table 7 suggests that the longer is 
the initial term of a contract, the lower is the firm's 
revenue derived from future contract revisions. This re-
sult is illustrated by the statistically significant and 
negative coefficients for Initial Contract Term. It may 
be the case that a contractor's monopoly power is re-
strained by the sponsor's option of terminating an incom-
plete contract at government convenience. Then the longer 
is the initial ter~ of a contract, the greater pr~fit a 
firm, on average, may lose as a result of contract 
termination by a sponsor. 
Another important result pertains to the "buyin hypo-
thesis" discussed earlier. Consider the behavior of the 
three variables measuring the level of competition in the 
award of a new contract, i.e., Industry Size, Non-Competi-
tively Negotiated, and Follows Research Competition. 
Their coefficients do not exhibit a pattern of sign rever-
sals, when comparing new contracts with modifications, 
that would support the view that greater competition in the 
award of a contract is more likely to result in untruth-
ful bidding and rewriting of contract terms. 
For example, in Table 6, Industry Size has a negative 
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sign and is significant at the five percent level. As 
expected, external competition appears to reduce the 
initial dollar flow associated with the award of a new 
contract. But Industry Size also has a negative and sig-
nificant sign in the Tobit model explaining dollar flow 
associated with contract modifications. A better informed 
sponsor and potential competition from other firms in the 
same industry may restrain the pricing of contract revi-
sions. 
The behavior of the dummy variable measuring whether 
a contract follows a research or design competition be-
tween different contractors, also is not supportive of a 
"buyin hypothesis." The two coefficients have positive 
and significant signs for both new contracts and subsequent 
contract changes. Perhaps the winner of a research compe-
tition possesses a superior technology or level of know-
ledge, and as a result, is in a strong position to nego-
tiate both initial contract price and future contract 
changes. Alternatively, contracts that follow a research 
competition may systematically involve higher cost and 
more intensive research efforts, the nature of which are 
not completely captured by the dummy variables that control 
for stage of research. 
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While the dummy variables that control for phase of 
R&D are not statistically significant at the five percent 
level, their exclusion from the Tobit and Regression models 
reduces the explanatory power of the other variables 
studied. Nevertheless the statisical weakness of the R&D 
variables may reflect a common level of labor intensity. 
Tables 6 and 7 provide conflicting evidence with re-
spect to the impact of contract selection on contractor 
revenues. Table 6 suggests that incentive contracts tend 
to have a larger initial dollar flow than fixed price and 
CPFF contracts. However, evidence of a relationship be-
tween revenue and contract type is not supported in the 
two sarnpels of modifications analyzed in Table 7. On the 
contrary, the statistically insignificant coefficients for 
the three contract categories supports the view that all 
types of R&D contracts are modif~ed to some degree to 
reflect research outcomes. In addition this result 
enhances the statistical validity of the multi-variate 
Probit model of contract selection discussed earlier. 
Two final variables influencing dollar flows are Agency 
Residual Budget and Initial Dollar Award. It appears that 
the larger is the sponsoring agency's Residual Budget 
in a particular research area, (defined by a FPDS Product 
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Service Code and research stage) the higher is the -do l lar 
flow to a contractor from both new contracts and modifica-
tions. If a government research sponsor is acting as a 
monopsonist, one might expect to observe a negative co-
efficient for Residual Budget. The opposite result may 
imply that certain research areas have been assigned pri-
orities for more intensive R&D funding. 
The initial dollar award on a contract appears to have 
a significant, but ambiguous effect on the pricing of con- . 
tract modifications. (See Table 7) 
Conclusions and Policy Implications 
The impact of competition on R&D contracting appears 
pervasive and beneficial, influencing the contract selec-
tion process, the initial determination of price, and nego-
tiation of modifications. · It is useful to differentiate 
between two types of competition: external competition 
among firms des·iring government contracts, and internal 
competition among existing contractors seeking modifica-
tions, extensions of their contracts, and renewal. High 
levels of external competition tend to lower a contractor's 
revenue from a new contract and encourage a sponsor to 
select a contract type that shifts financial risk towards 
industry. In contrast, the expectation of internal 
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competition among contractors working in similar research 
areas, may cause the government to substitute competi-
tion for contractual risk sharing, as a means of encour-
aging both risky research and an efficient R&D effort. 
The ~mpirical work in this chapter was made possible 
because the author was able to enhance the statistical 
power of the Federal Procurement Data system through ex-
tensive data processing. Thus the FPDS was not designed 
to answer the questions analyzed in this chapter. In view 
of the size of projected Defense outlays over the next 
decade and the importance to national security of monitor-
ing the performance of the government's procurement system, 
the FPDS ought to be improved. In particular, modifica-
tions of · the system should focus on 1) obtaining a more 
precise description of the competitive environment affect-
ing a contract action, 2) the reasons for a contract mod-
ification, e.g., extension, renewal, overrun, incentive 
payment, etc. , 3) a qualitative record of contract out-
comes, e.g. R&D objectives were achieved, exceeded or 
scaled back. These changes would enable future researchers 
to more accurately determine the characteristics of optimal 
procurement systems. 
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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 2 
1. The question of program continuity and termination of 
contracts is a vital issue to industry. See the dis-
cussion in "Risk Elements In Government Contracting," 
mimeo, Aerospace Industries Association (October 1970). 
2. For example, it is reported by N. Rosenberg, Perspec-
tives on Technology, Cambridge, University Press 1976, 
pp. 69-70, that the interval varies considerably 
among innovations. The flourescent lamp took 79 years 
while streptomycin took 5. 
3. See the discussion pertaining to General Electric's 
optimism in a prototype development project funded 
by the Department of Energy, in Balbien, J. 
"A Probilistic Cost Study of Solar Thermal Power 
Systems," mimeo, Jet Propulsion Laboratory (1981). 
4. For example, see the discussion by J. Gansler, De-
fense Industry Consultant, in Science Volo 212 (April 
1981) 1 P• 312 
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5. A brief history of the Office of Federal Procurement 
Policy is contained in the first volume of a Reporting 
Manual published by the Federal Procurement Data Center. 
Further insight was obtained through interviews with 
FPDS employees in Washington D.C. during Spring 1981. 
See "Federal Procurement Data System REPORTING MANUAL, 
Volume 1," Office of Management and Budget, (October 1979). 
6. As above see "FPDS REPORTING MANUAL, Volume 1," 
(OCtober 1979). 
7. The most important exclusions from the stand point 
of sponsored research are R&D grants, mostly to 
universities, offered by DOD, The National Science 
Foundation,. and NASA. In addition federal assistance 
programs directed at subsidizing private demonstrations 
of new technology are not under the jurisdiction of . 
the Office of Federal Procurement Policy. 
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8. The 11 types of contracts that can be coded into the 
federal procurement data system include: 
i) Fixed Price Redetermination 
ii) Firm Fixed Price 
iii) Fixed Price Economic Price Adjustment 
iv) Fixed Price Incentive 
v) Cost Plus Award Fee 
vi) Cost Plus Incentive Fee 
vii) Cost Plus Fixed Fee 
viii) Cost No Fee 
ix) Labor Hour 
x) Time & Materials 
xi) Cost Sharing 
Ninety-seven percent of the sample of new defense 
contracts were either a type of fixed price contract, 
cost plus incentive fee or cost plus fixed fee. The 
small sample of award fee contracts, which link a 
contractor's performance on several dimensions (in-
cluding overrun) to its profit rate, were pooled 
with the larger sample of incentive contracts. In 
view of their scarcity, and the objectives of this 
study, the residual contract types were dropped from 
the sample. Their selection by a sponsor is likely 
to be associated with factors beyond the scope of 
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this study. 
9. For example product service codes for defense appli-
cations recognize the following areas: 
~) Defense Aircraft R&D 
ii) Defense Missle & Space Systems R&D 
iii) Defense Ships R&D 
iv) Defense Tank - Automotive R&D 
v) Weapons R&D 
v~) Defense Electronics & Communications Equipment 
R&D 
vii) Ammunition R&D 
viii) Services R&D 
ix) Subsistence R&D 
x) Textiles R&D 
xi) Construction 
In addition, each contract receives an R&D code iden-
tifying the phase of research and development associ-
ated with each product or service being rendered. The 
categories of R&D relevant to the sample of contracts 
analyzed in this study are defined below. 
i) "Research - includes all effort of scient~fic and 
experimentation directed toward increasing know-
ledge and understanding in those fields of the 
74 
physical, engineering, environmental and iife 
sciences related to long term national security 
needs. It provides fundamental knowledqe re-
quired for the solution of social, economic, 
political, physical or military problems. It 
forms a part of the base for subsequent explor-
atory and advanced developments in the various 
technologies, and new or improved functional 
capabilities in areas such as communications, 
propulsion, medicine, mobility, tracking, 
surveillance, propulsion, medicine, mobility, 
guidance and control, navigation, energy con-
version, materials and structures, transporta-
tion, personnel support, and social services. 
ii) Exploratory Development - includes all effort 
directed toward the solution of specific prob-
lems, short of major development projects. 
This type of effort may vary from fairly fun-
damental applied research to quite sophisti-
cated bread-board hardware, study, programming 
and planning efforts. It would thus include 
studies, investigations, and minor development 
efforts. The dominant characteristic of this 
category of effort is that it be pointed to-
ward specific problem areas with a view toward 
developing and evaluating the feasibility and 
practicability of proposed solutions and de-
termining their parameters. 
iii) Advanced Development- includes all effort di-
rected toward projects which have moved into the 
development of hardware for test. The prime 
result of this type of effort is proof of de-
sign concept rather than the development of 
hardware for service use. Projects in this 
category have a potential application. 
iv) Engineering Development- includes those projects 
in full-scale engineering development for Govern-
ment use .. ," .Ln mimeo, Office of Management and 
Budget, -"Federal Procurement Data System-Product 
Service Codes," (April 1980). 
10. Ideally one could observe the exact risk sharing factor 
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for each contract. Then fixed price contracts could 
be coded as O, CPFF as 1.0, and the sharing ratio 
for each incentive contract would- fall somewhere in 
between. However, because the FPDS does not record 
the precise risk sharing ratio associated with an 
incentive contract, the three categories have been 
assigned consecutive integer values as illustrated 
in Table 5. 
11. The total dollar value of the contract was excluded 
from the specification in Table 5, because it is 
assumed that the sponsor selects the general contract 
type prior to choosing a contractor and/or negotiating 
the final contract price. Nevertheless, the qualita-
tive results in Table 5, i.e., the signs of the co-
efficients and their statistical significance levels, 
are robust to the addition of other variables includ-
ing contract price. 
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CHAPITIK 3 
A DYNAMIC MODEL OF TARGETING IN R AND D COt1TRACTS 
I. IN'IRODUCTION AND PRELIMINARIES 
This chapter analyzes a model in which a sponsor contracts 
with a single firm to engage in research over a sequence of periods. 
At the beginning of each period the firm inherits a research 
performance target it hopes to meet by the end of the period. This 
target might represent a reduction in expected cost for some 
manufacturing process or the increased potency of an anti-cancer drug. 
The firm selects a level of research effort, conducts research, and 
observes the output of the research process. If the current target is 
achieved a new target is selected for the next period. The old target 
becomes the new state of sponsor knowledge for the next period and 
therefore a baseline for measuring further advances. 
The model introduced below will necessarily be highly 
stylized -- it makes several strong assumptions about the nature of 
the research process and the contractual reward to the firm. Focusing 
on the dynamic nature of the research environment requires that one 
simplify as far as possible the dimensions of the problem that are not 
intimately connected with qualitative aspects of the firm's choice of 
research effort and targeting decision. The idea is to create a 
filter for evaluating alternative contractual relationships. 
Contractual forms taken from more complex environments which do not 
perform well in a simplified research environment are unlikely to 
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operate well when various complications are added. 
One simplifying assumption concerns the nature of the R and D 
process within the firm. In order to focus on the dynamic aspects of 
the firm's research strategy, production of knowledge is modeled as 
random draws from a probability distribution over some measure of 
''performance.'' The implication of relaxing this assumption is 
discussed in the conclusion. 
Three crucial assumptions will also be made about the nature 
of the research contract. These assumptions capture the essence of 
the incentive problem from the firm's perspective. First it is 
assumed that in any given period, the firm's reward depends on 
fulfillment of the current performance target, X. If that goal is 
met, then the reward is a function of the target and the current state 
of sponsor knowledge, a level of performance R. If the target is not 
met, the firm's contract with the sponsor is not renewed. More 
formally, the instantaneous reward for fulfilling the current target 
is W(X,R). The firm receives no additional bonus for reporting 
progresses beyond the target. 
It is also assumed that Wx(X,R) > 0 and WR(X,R) < 0; the 
greater the difference between the current target and sponsor known 
performance, the higher the payoff to the firm if the target is 
achieved. Furthermore it is assumed that WRR and WXX are negative, 
which simply folloW$ from diminishing returns. 
It turns out that the properties of the firm's behavior under 
the stylized contract modeled here are sensitive to the sign of the 
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cross pa;tial derivative WXR(X,R). In the first section of the paper 
the model is analyzed under the assumption that WXR(X,R) 2. 0. Letting 
Wy~ be non-negative implies that the marginal return to setting higher 
performance targets remains high as sponsor knowledge increases. 
II. TilE MODEL 
Let Vt(a,R,X) be the discounted expected profits from pursuing 
an optimal R and D plan when there are t periods remaining in the 
firm's planning horizon. The time index t can be thought of as the 
number of contracts the firm believes are available to it if all 
future targets are fulfilled. The firm's level of privately held 
knowledge at the beginning of a research period is represented by a. 
One issue that arises in a model of this sort is the nature of 
expectations over research potential. In principle placing no 
particular structure on expectations is ideal (e.g., Balbien and 
Wilde, 1980). However in practice there are two problems with the 
most general approach. Interviews with R and D engineers suggest they 
seldom have a strong notion of the shape of the distribution of 
research potential but feel confident about its upper and lower 
bounds. Secondly certain technical problems arise, further 
complicating the model, if no structure is placed on expectations. 
Given these facts it will be assumed herein that research potential is 
described by the uniform distribution. For notational convenience the 
distribution is normalized to be over [0,1]. 
In describing the research firm's strategy (in this case the 
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choice of whether or not to conduct research in the current period and 
a choice of a target for the next period), it is useful to distinguish 
between two cases. In case I, a < X; that is the level of privately 
held knowledge yields a level of performance (essentially the 
technology a firm has in inventory). which falls short of the 
currently active research target (which the firm set in the previous 
period). In this situation the firm has a ''risky target'' and must 
. either conduct research or forfeit both the current reward and future 
contract opportunities on this particular project. 
Thus for a < X, 
[W(X,R) + max Vt_1 (Z,X.x)](1-X) 
li.x2.X 
(1) 
The logic of (1) is as follows. If the firm does research it incurs a 
cost c. If the outcome of its research, a random variable denoted by 
z. is less than X (the currently active target) the firm gets no 
reward and its contract with the sponsor is not renewed. If Z i. X 
then it earns a reward for meeting the current target. W(X,R). and 
gets to sign a new contract which specifies a new target, x. Of 
course xis set to maximize Vt_1 (Z,X,x). Note that the new target is 
set after the random variable representing research output is 
observed. Therefore the expectation, E. of maximized discounted 
profits when t-1 contracts remain is evaluated conditional upon the 
random performance variable, Z, being greater than or equal to the 
currently active target, X. 
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Finally if Z l X the firm has the choice of setting the new 
target at a level of performance either above, equal to, or below its 
level of private knowledge. The firm will be said to set a ''risky 
target'' if x > max {a,Z}, and a ''safe target'' if x i max {a,Z}. 
In case II where a > X, the firm can fulfill the current 
target by drawing upon its technology inventory; i.e., research is not 
compulsory. 
In this case, for a l X, 
{
-c + W(X,R) + E ~ max V(max{a,Z},X,x) 
1lx2.X 
= max 'u(X,R) + A ( ) 
II p max vt-1 a,X,x 
1lx2.X 
(2) 
The first term in (2) again reflects discounted expected profits when 
the firm conducts research and then, depending on the results of that 
research, decides whether to set a risky or safe target. The second 
term reflects expected profits when the firm does not conduct new 
research in the current period and merely m~ets the current target 
''out of inventory.'' Nevertheless, depending on a, either a risky 
target or a safe target may be set for the next contract. 
In both case ~ and II, the relevant discount rate is 
P s (0,1). Equations (1) and (2) hold for t 2. 1. For t = 0 define 
V0 (a,R,X) = 0 for all a,R,X. If a > R there might be some profit to 
the firm from selling the residual information to other private 
parties, but it is assumed that penalties for such action are so 
severe as to eliminate this possibility. 
One final assumption important to a firm's targeting strategy 
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concerns whether the sponsor will renew the firm's contract if the 
research firm sets a ''safe target'' with respect to the level of 
sponsor knowledge. i.e. the firm sets X = R. Under one scenario. a 
sponsor might require that a firm demonstrate some minimal improvement 
in sponsor knowledge as a condition for contract renewal. Such a 
policy would encourage the setting of risky targets when a firm 
exhausted its inventory of knowledge. but might lead to premature 
cancellation of research projects if targets are not achieved. An 
alternative policy. implicit in equations (1) and (2) permits contract 
renewal when the firm sets X = R. However W(R.R) is still assumed to 
be equal to 0. 
The formal analysis of this model focuses on two aspects of a 
firm's research strategy over a sequence of contracts: (i) a firm's 
choice of research effort in the current period as determined by the 
firm's level of private knowledge. the level of sponsor known 
performance. the currently active target. the cost of research. and 
the number of remaining contracts in which the firm expects to 
participate; and (ii) the decision to set a safe target versus a risky 
target for the next research period as determined by the level of 
privately known performance at the end of the research period. the 
level of sponsor knowledge. research costs. and again the length of 
I . 
the firm's planning horizon. The analysis proceeds by induction. 
working backwards from the end of the horizon; i.e •• beginning with t 
= 1. 
In case I (where a < X) 
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+ W(X,R) (1 - X) 
(3} 
The firm conducts research if and only if W(X,R}(1-X} > c. 
The function W(X,R)(1-X} is concave in X. It has a negative slope at 
X= 1 and positive slope at X= R (since R ~ 1 and WX(R,R) > W(R,R). 
Among the set of targets that produce non-negative expected returns 
one can define the least and most ambitious profitable targets by 
a1 = min{XfW(X,R)(1-X) l c; 1 l X l R} 
b1 = max{XfW(X,R)(1-X} - l c; 1 l X l R} 
If X > b1 , then the likelihood of meeting the current target 
is so low that no research is conducted. If X < a1 , the probability 
of meeting the current target is high but the payoff is so low that 
again, no research is c-onducted. The boundary targets are illustrated 
in Figure 1. 
Lemma 1 examines the sensitivity of the least and most 
ambitious profitable targets to changes in the cost of research and 
the levels of sponsor known performance. The proof of this result 
(and all which follow) can be found in an appendix. 
Lemma 1: 
da1 > 0, and 
db1 
< 0; de de 
da1 > 
db1 
< o. dR 0 and dR 
This lemma implies that when a firm faces a risky target in the final 
research period, the worse the state of sponsor knowledge (i.e. the 
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lower is R) the more likely the firm is to conduct research. This 
result follows from the assumption that the reward to the firm for 
fulfillment of the current target increases as the difference between 
sponsor knowledge and the current target increases (i.e., 
WR(X,R) < 0). Raising R reduces the profitability of conducting 
research without af~ecting the likelihood of achieving the target. As 
expected, Lemma 1 also implies that the lower the cost of research, 
the more likely the firm is to conduct research. As can be seen in 
Figure 1, increasing the cost of research decreases the size of the 
set defined by the least and most ambitious profitable targets and 
reduces the profitability of conducting research for all levels of 
performance target. 
All that remains in the one period problem is the case of 
a i. X. Since V0 (a,R,x,) is defined to be zero, for a L. X 
No research is conducted and at least a level of performance X is 
delivered to the sponsor. 
the 
(4) 
In order to establish results for t L. 2, certain cross 
partials and second derivatives of V
1
(a,R,X) need to be analyzed. The 
formal details can be found in the appendix. The important point is 
that V
1
(a,R,X) is concave in its arguments. 
III. mE MODEL WITH t = 2 
The two period problem is richer than its one period analogue 
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since the firm now sets an optimal target for the last period's 
research after deciding whether to conduct research during the second 
to the last period. 





and for X i a 









W(X,R) + P max V1 (a,X,x) XS,xS,l 
Recall that the target for the final period is set after 
(5) 
(6) 
observing the current period's research output. The analysis of the 
two period problem begins by taking that output as given and examining 
the target setting decision of the firm as a function of it. If the 




V1 (a,X,x) =max 
W(a,X) 
(7) 
In (7), a is treated as the firm's privately held level of performance 
(at the opening of the final research period); whether it represents 
inventory held over from earlier research periods or the result of new 
research is unimportant at this point. 
The firm's problem is to choose a performance target for the 
final period which maximizes V1 (a,X,x). Since WX > 0 and 
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V0 (a,R,X) = 0, it never pays the firm to withhold information in 
setting the final period's target; i.e. the firm either reveals all it 
• knows or sets a risky target. Let x2 be the optimal target i.e., 
• • • x2 = argmax v1 Ca,X,x). 
X.ix.il 
Then x2 = a or x2 = r 2 where 
r 2 = argmax W(x,X)(l-x) - c • a<x.il 
• • That is r 2 is the optimal risky target. Whether x2 = r 2 or x2 = a 
depends on which yields higher expected profits. In other words, 
Note that the optimal target for the final research period is 
subscripted by t = 2 because it is reported to the sponsor at the 
close of the second to the last research period. Equation (8) follows 
• directly from (7) where V1 (a,X,x) is evaluated either at x2 = r 2 or 
• • It shows that whether x2 = r 2 or x2 =a depends on a. Define 
a2 as the level of private knowledge · that makes a firm indifferent 
between a safe and risky target, i.e., the value of a that satisfies: 
( 9) 
However let a2 = 0 if c > W(r2 ,X)(l - r 2 > - W(a,X) for all a l x. 
• No When a l a 2 , the firm sets x2 = a, which is a safe target. new 
research will be conducted and all information will be revealed. If 
• a < a2 then x2 = r 2 , which is a risky performance target. Research 
will be conducted in the final period and at least r 2 revealed, if the 
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target is met. Thus a
2 
is a critical level of private knowledge 
making the firm indifferent between a risky and safe targeting 
strategy in the two period problem. 
Figure 2 illustrates the definition of a
2
• In addition Figure 
3 illustrates the relationship between r
2
, c, a 2 , and X. 
Using a2 , (7) can be rewritten in a more useful form. 
Before continuing, consider the properties of a
2 
as a function of 
research costs, · c~ and the new state of sponsor knowledge, X. 





2 < 0 de 









is uniquely defined by c and X obtains because the optimal 
risky target r
2 
is independent of the firm's level of private 
knowledge, while W(a,R) is increasing in a. Lemma 2 also implies that 
the lower the . cost of research and the better the new state of public 
knowledge, the more likely the firm is to set a risky target for the 
final research period. The first result is obvious (see Figure 2) 
since a decision to set a risky target implies that research is 
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compulsory in the final period. and a larger value of c makes this 
research more costly. The second result obtains because if X. the 
currently active target at t = 2. is met. it becomes the final 
period's level of sponsor knowledge. As a result. a higher level of 
sponsor known performance must be accompanied by a higher level of 
privately known performance. if the firm is to remain indifferent 
between the two targeting strategies. 




WXR l 0 implies dX > 0 
• dx2 
a l a2 implies dX = 0 
This lemma suggests that the better the state of sponsor 
knowledge the higher the risky target set for the last research 
period. Again this result holds because the current target. X. if 
achieved. becomes the level of sponsor knowledge in the last research 
period. Finally Lemma 4 implies that if a firm's level of private 
knowledge reaches at least the critical level of a
2
• the firm's 
• optimal target. x
2 
is independent of the new level of sponsor known 
performance. This is an obvious result since a l a
2 
implies that the 
firm reveals everything it knows. 
Using a
2 
it is now possible to back up to the beginning of the 
second to the last period and write V
2
(a.R.X) in a more useful form. 
If a is less than the current target in the second to the last period. 
a
2 





-c + W(X.R)(1-X) + ~s V1 (z.X.r2 )dz 
X 




But for a l X it is impossible to know whether a < a
2 
or a l a
2
• Thus 
the most one can say is that 
(12) 
Consider first the case of a l X. From (12) the firm does research 
when two research periods remain in the firms planning horizon if and 
only if the expected net benefits are positive. i.~. 
( 13) 
• Define a 2 to be 0 if 
• Otherwise a
2 
is defined by 
c = ( 14) 
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* The reservation level a
2 
is a level of private knowledge that makes a 
firm indifferent between conducting research and not conducting 
* research. In general one can assert that if a
2 
is greater than 0, 
then the reservation level for conducting research is also greater 
than a
2
, the critical level of private knowledge that makes the firm 
indifferent between setting a ''risky'' versus a ''safe'' target at 
the end of the second to the last research period. This implies that 1 
when the firm begins the second to the last research period with a 
level of private knowledge below the cutoff point for setting a safe 
target, it always conducts research hoping to avoid the need to set a 
• risky performance target for its last contract. Therefore if a2 > 0, 
equation (14) becomes 
c = 
• The next lemma establishes properties of a
2 
• 
• Lemma 4: a
2 
is uniquely defined. Furthermore 
( i) 
( ii) 
* da2 < 0 and 
de 
* da2 
WXR > 0 implies dX > 0 
• The definition of a
2 




-c + W(X,R) + ps: 
+~f 
a (16) 
All that remains in the analysis of the two period problem is 
to consider under what conditions the firm might voluntarily drop out 
by failing to conduct research when a < X. The firm conducts research 
for a < X if 
The right hand side of (17) is analogous to W(X,R)(1-X) in the one 
period problem. It turns out that this function is quasiconcave so 
that results similar to those derived in the one period problem can be 
stated. Among the set of targets that produce non-negative expected 
returns. define the least and most ambitious by 
a2 
a2 = min{X/W(X,R)(1-X) + p<J V1 (z.x,x;)dz X 
+ ~ V1 (z,x,z)dz) L C; 1 LX L R] 
a2 
a2 
b 2 = max{X/W(X,R)(1-X) + P<J V1 (z,x,x;)dz X 
+ ~ V1 (z,X,z)dz) l C; 1 l X l Rl 
a2 
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illustrated in Figure 4. 
In the two period problem. a2 might equal the current level of 
sponsor knowledge. R. particularly if the firm was hopeful of making 
progress in its next sampling of the distribution over research 
potential. 
Analogous to Lemma 1. comparative statics results can be 
Lemma 5: ( i) 
da2 db2 
dR < 0 and dR ) 0 • 
( ii) 
da2 db2 
de > 0 and de < 0 • 
This lemma implies that the analysis concerning the least and most 
ambitious profitable targets in the one period problem generalizes to 
the case of two periods. When the firm sets a risky target in the 
third to the last research period. it is less likely to voluntarily 
drop out of the project. the worse the level of sponsor known 
performance and the lower the cost of research. 
This lemma implies that when the currently active target is risky and 
the level of sponsor knowledge is held constant. the longer the firm's 
planning horizon the less likely the firm is to drop out by failing to 
conduct research. 
This result follows directly from (17) which has all positive 
92 
terms. The size of the set of targets providing non-negative returns, 
(which is bounded by the least and most ambitious profitable targets), 
increases in the two period model relative to the single period case. 
When two contracts remain, failure to do research not only implies the 
loss of the current reward but a future contract opportunity as well. 
The definition of the least and most ambitious profitable 
targets enables one to rewrite (11). 
&ra)X 
r a2 
-c + [W(X,R)(1-X) + ~J v1 <z,x,~>dz 
X 
V2 (a,R,X) = + P~ v1<z,x,z2ldzl X e [a2,b2] (18) 
a2 
0 X < a2 , X > b2 
To summarize the analysis up to this point, working backwards 
from the end of the second to the last period, the definition of a
2 
as 
a critical level of private knowledge for setting a risky vs a safe 
performance target, enables one to simplify an inherently complicated 
research strategy. As a result it is possible to back up to the 
beginning of the research period and analyze the firm's decision to 
conduct research for the two cases of a l X and a < X. In the former 
• • case a reservation level of private knowledge a
2 
determines whether 1t 
is profitable to conduct research when facing a safe target. In the 
latter case, where a ( X and future contracts are at risk, the 
decision to conduct research as opposed to dropping out of the project 
depends on the current target X belonging to a set defined by the last 
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and most ambitious targets producing non-negative returns. 
IV • TIIE MODEL W ITII t > 2 
Now that the firm's research strategy in the two period case 
is fully characterized, it is possible to consider the firm's 
selection of targets and decision to conduct research when three or 
more periods remain in the planning horizon. The multiperiod problem 
is more complicated than a two period R and D project because when t = 
3 the firm's best safe target at the end of the period is not 
necessarily to reveal everything it knows. Instead the firm may have 
an incentive to temporarily withhold some of its private knowledge. 
This knowledge inventory can then be depleted over the remaining 
research periods so as to maximize the net present value of profits. 
A conservative strategy of sequentially setting higher safe 
performance targets also insures the firm against the risk of losing 
profits on the two remaining contracts if it encounters a bad draw 
from the distribution over research potential. 
When t = 3 and a < X equation (1) gives 
-c + [W(X,R) + ~ E max V2 (Z,X,x)](l-X) 
Z>X Xixil 
0 




-c + W(X,R) + PE max V2 (max{a,Z},X,x) 
Xixil 







Analogous to the two period problem. one begins by taking the 
output of the third to the last research period as given. and 
examining the target setting decision of the firm as a function of it. 
Once the targeting decision is fully characterized one can again back 
up to the beginning of the third to the last research period and embed 
the solution to the two period targeting problem in a three period 
setting. 
The firm's objective at the end of the third to the last 
research period is to choose a target for the next contract which 
maximizes V2 (a.X.x). In general all one can say about v2 <a.X.x) is 
that it (1) has a discontinuity at x = a. (2) is quasiconcave with 
respect to x. and (3) has negative slope at x = 1 • 
• Let x
3 
be the optimal performance target with respect to 




argmax v2 <a.X.x) • 
Xixi1 
r 3 = argmax v2 <a.X.x) 
a<xi1 
However since the optimal safe target is not necessarily a in the 
three period problem. one must also define 
Then 





v2 <a.x.r3 ) > v2 <a.x.s3 ) 
v2 <a.x.r3 ) i v2 <a.x.s3 > 
Of course whether the firm sets a safe or risky performance target 
(21) 
depends on its level of private knowledge at the end of the research 
period. Therefore analogous to the definition of the critical level 
of private knowledge a 2 • define a 3 
to be 0 if 
Otherwise define a
3 
to be that level of private _knowledge which makes 
the firm indifferent between setting a safe and risky target; e.g. a
3 
is that value of a which satisfies 
(22) 
If a < a
3 
then the firm sets a risky target. while a l a
3 
implies that 
a safe target is set. Lemma 10 establishes properties of a
3 
as a 
function of research costs and the state of sponsor knowledge. 
Lemma 7: a3 is uniquely defined. Furth.ermore 
( i) 
( ii) 
da3 -- < 0 and 
de -
da3 
WXR L 0 implies that dX > 0 • 
Analogous to the case of t = 2. the better the new state of sponsor 
knowledge at the end of the third to the last research period. or the 
lower the cost of research. the more likely the firm is to set a risky 
target for the second to the last contract. 
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If the firm knows it will set a safe target (a L ~3 ) the 
question arise .s whether the firm will reveal everything it knows by 
setting s
3 
= a. or temporarily withhold some private knowledge. It 
turns . out that one can define a second critical level of private 
knowledge which makes the firm indifferent between revealing 
everything it knows and withholding some private knowledge. i.e •• a 
level of a. ~ which satisfies 
av2 (g:3. R. x) I 




In effect ~3 is a level of private knowledge which just satisfies the 
first order condition implicit in the firm's selection of an optimal 
safe target. The properties of ~ are described below. 









(a.X.x) concave in x and WXR > 0 implies dX > 0 
The better the new state of sponsor knowledge. the more likely the 
firm is to reveal all it knows at the end of the research period by 
setting a target which equals its current state of private knowledge. 
Surprisingly the cost of research does not affect the likelihoo~ the 
firm reveals all it knows. 
The definitions of ~3 and a3 enable one to rewrite (21) in a 
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more usef~l form. 
G3 if al~ 
* 
=t3 
x3 if ~ l a L a3 (24) 
if a3 > a 
where s 3 < a. 
To summarize. in the three period problem there are three 
instead of two target setting modes for a research firm working under 
contract. When private knowledge is poor and probabilities of 
research progress are high. the firm sets a risky target for its 
research. As both sponsor and privately known performance ~1proves. 
setting a risky target makes contract renewal more uncertain. As a 
result the firm becomes more conservative and reveals the current 
state of private knowledge as the target for the next contract. 
Finally. if very high levels of performance are achieved the firm 
insures contracting continuity and maximum profits by setting safe 
targets that temporarily withhold some private knowledge and thereby 
reveal the results of the firm's research over a sequence of 
contracts. 
In order to complete the analysis of the firm's research 
strategy in a three period setting. comparative dynamic properties of 
s 3 • r 3
• and a
3 
as well as the relationship between optimal targets. 
research cost and sponsor knowledge must be described. In addition 
* a
3
• a level of private knowledge that makes the firm indifferent 
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between conducting research and not doing research at the beginning of 
the third to the last research period~ must be defined and its 
properties described. Finally the three period analysis needs to be 
generalized to t periods. 
Lemma 9: When s3 is an interior solution: 
( i) ds3 = 0 
de 
(ii) V2 <a~X~x) concave and WY~ > 0 implies 
ds3 
a) dX > 0 and 
b) 
ds3 
da > 0 
Furthermore when r
3 
is an interi"or solution: 
dr3 dr3 




concave and WXR l 0 implies dX > 0 • 
Lemma 9 implies that in the multiperiod setting~ the level of 
a risky target and the amount of information revealed through a safe 
target are both independent of the cost of acquiring new information. 
However~ as noted earlier~ the decision whether to set either a risky 
or safe target is determined in part by research costs. 
Furthermore the Lemma implies that the better the state of 
sponsor knowledge~ the higher is the risk~ performance target set by 
the firm and the larger is the share of the firm's private knowledge 
revealed through a safe target. 
The next two lemma focus on comparative dynamic properties of 
a firm's targeting strategy. 
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In particular Leoma 10 compares the firm's optimal safe 
targets <s 3 and s2 ), optimal risky targets (r3 
and r
2
), and the 




), holding the levels of 
sponsor and privately known performance constant. 
Lemma 10: ( i) r
3 
(X) < r 2 (X) 
( i i) • s
3
(X) < x 2 (X) 
(iii) a
3 
(X) > ( a3 (X) 
The first result implies that the longer the firm's planning horizon, 
the lower the optimal risky target that is set. When there are two as 
opposed to one remaining co~tract, the firm is concerned about the 
impact of the new target on its chances for contract renewal and the 
value of its research reports in the last research period. 
Similarly, the second result implies that the longer the 
firm's planning horizon the more likely the firm is to withhold 
information uncovered in its research. This result obtains because a 
firm setting a safe target for the last contract reveals everything it 
knows. This is not necessarily the case when the firm expects that 
two or more contracts remain. 
Finally the third part of the lemma establishes that, in 
general, one cannot say whether the firm is more or less likely to set 
a risky target as the firm's planning horizon increases from two to 
three periods. The firm's preference for a big immediate payoff and 
the discounting of future rewards encourages the setting of risky 
targets as the planning horizon increases, while a more conservative 
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strategy of setting safe targets or temporarily withholding some 
private knowledge to be reported over a sequence of periods~ insures 
contract renewal and a higher expected reward. 
Now~ one can return to the beginning of the third to the last 
research period. and analyze the firm's decision to conduct research 
when its current target is safe~ i.e. a LX. The firm does research 
if its level of private knowledge and cost of research satisfy the 
following inequality 
• If the inequality is not satisfied for a L o~ define a3 to be o • 
• Otherwise a
3 
is defined by 
c = 
• • Analogous to the definition of a2 ~ a3 is a level of private knowledge 
which makes a firm indifferent between conducting research and not 
conducting research~ when three periods remain. One can again assert 
• • that a
3 
l a3 ~ which implies that when the firm begins the research 
period with a level of private knowledge less than the cut off point 
for setting a risky target~ i.e. a < a3 ~ it always conducts research 
hoping to avoid the need to set a risky performance target. The next 
• two lemmas describe the properties of a 3 • 
Lemma 11: • c and X define values of a3 ~ which may or may not be 
unique. 
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3 > 0 is implied by WXR > 0 dX 
* 
( ii) 
da3 < 0 de 
* Analogous to a
2
, the higher the level of sponsor known performance and 
the lower are research costs, the more likely is the firm to conduct 
research. 
Lemma * * 12: Necessary conditions for a3 2. a2, are 
( i) WXR > 0 
j\ 
( ii) p > II > 0 
In order for the firm to be more likely to conduct research the longer 
its planning horizon, holding the level of sponsor knowledge and 
research costs constant the marginal return to revealing higher levels 
of performance must increase as sponsor knowledge increases. In 
addition the firm's discount rate must be sufficiently low. 
Next, an induction argument is utilized to place the analysis 
of the firm's research strategy fort= 2,3 in a more general 
framework. 
Theorem 1: Vt(a,R,X) is strictly quasiconcave in X. 
(a) Suppose X > a. If there exists levels of the current target 
producing nonnegative expected returns, one can define least 
and most ambitious targets acceptable to the firm by 








bt = max{XJW(X,R)(l-X) + E f3 
Z,LX 
max Vt_1 (z,X,x)(l-X) .L c} 
l.Lx.LX 
Furthermore, for at and bt > 0, 
dat dbt 
( i) > 0 and -- < 0 dR em 
dat dbt 
(ii) de .L 0 and de < 0 
(iii) at(R) i at_1 (R) and bt(R) > bt_1 (R). 
(iv) The firm voluntarily drops out of the research 
program for all X e [O,at) and X e (bt,l] 
(b) Suppose X < a. If there exist levels of privately known 
performance low enough so that conducting research provides 
non-negative expected returns, one can define a reservation 
level of private knowledge making a firm indifferent between 
conducting research and not conducting research, i.e. 
{(a,X,R)J-c + E f3 max Vt_
1





• {(a,X,R)Ia < at(c,X)} 




> 0 de 
• 
( ii) WXR > 0 
dat 
implies dX > o. 
1\ • (iii) WXR ) 0 and 13 ) ~ intpl ies at ( c, X) 
1\ 
where f3 ) ~ ) 0 
• .L a t-l (c, X), 
103 
(c) At the end of the current research period, if the target is 
met the firm has an opportunity to set a new target for the 
next contract. Define the optimal performance target 
Also let 
and 





= 0 = 
dst 
de de 
( ii) WXR 2. 0 implies r t (X) < rt-l(X) and 
WXR > 0 implies st (X) < st-l(X) 
Furthermore if Vt-l (a,X,x) is strictly concave, 
( i) WXR 2. 0 
drt 
implies dX > 0 
( ii) WXR > 0 
dst 
implies dX > 0 
(iii) WXR > 0 implies that ~ > 0 da 
(d) If there exist value.s of a such that a firm setting a risky 
as opposed t~ a safe target expects increased returns, one 
can define a critical level of a, at, that makes a firm 
indifferent between setting a safe and risky target. That 





WXR 2 0 implies dX > 0 
( ii) 
dat 
de i 0 
(iii) > at(X) < at (X) 
rt if a < at 
( iv) • xt = a if at i a i ~t 
st a > 2:t 
where st < a and 2:t is a second critical level of private 
knowledge satisfying 
(v) If Vt_1 (a,X,x) is strictly concave and WXR l 0 
d2:t 






The model developed in this paper can be extended to address 
particular problems in research contracting and to reflect more 
complex research environments. For example there might be learning by 
the firm as research unfolds. This can be modeled by letting F(z;a) 
be the distribution over research potential, given the firm's level of 
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privately known performance a. Learning is ·represented by assuming 
that oF~~;a) < 0- i.e._ the higher the level of privately known 
performance the better the chances of making further progress. 
In addition the firm's choice of research effort might be a 
continuous variable defined in terms of multiple draws from the same 
distributions_ each one associated with a unique sampling cost and 
expected performance. Although adding these complications would 
enhance the realism. of the model_ perhaps making it more likely that 
the firm conducts research and sets higher targets- one would not 
expect the basic qualitative results to change. 
One extension that is likely to have a major · impact on the 
firm's behavior is the introduction of (i) a second research firm who 
also sets targets and conducts research for a sponsor_ or (ii) several 
firms any one of which can bid away the bilateral monopoly position of 
the firm relative to the sponsor- by revealing a level of knowledge 
superior to the current performance target promised by the firm. 
Although the competitive case has not been analyzed in detail, it 
appears that the presence of a second firm may discourage the 
withholding of private knowledge and perhaps encourage the setting of 
risky targets. However competition might discourage research by 
leading the firm to discount the availability of future contracts and 
the reward for target fulfillment. 
A final extension involves the addition to the firm's profit 
function of a term reflecting the value of human capital built up over 
a sequence of pe.riods. Early studies of weapons procurement 
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acquisitioned through various forms of cost reimbursement contracts 
have suggested capitalization of R and D advances in federal system 
acquisitions and the training of personnel as an ~portant motivation 
for cost growth. In the model presented in this paper. capitalization 
of R and D advances and the build up of human capital would encourage 
the setting of safe targets in order to insure contract renewal. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The model analyzed in this paper again confirms that incentive 
problems may arise in contracting for research when one goes from a 
static to a dynamic setting. A firm's targeting behavior and choice 
of research effort over a sequence of periods is sensitive in a 
predictable fashion to the changing information assymetries that exist 




































\'iR( r 2 ,X) (1-r2
) < 0 
.W R ( a , X) < 0 
· dr 
WRR(r2 ,X)(1-r2 >-[WR(r2 ,X)-WXR(r2 ,X)(1-r2 ) ]dX
2 ~ 0 
= {( 1-r2 )WXR( r 2 ,X) - WR(r2 ,X) > 0 
"m 2. o 
= {1XX( r 2 ,X) (1-r2 J - 2Wx<r2 ,x> < o 
Wxx(a,X) < o 




* APPENDIX II: PROPERTIES OF V2 (a,X,x3 ) 
a2 
[w<r3 ,X)(l-r3 ) + J pV1 (z,r3 ,z)dZ + 
r3 
l JlV1 (z,r3 .r2 )dz] r 3 • [.,_2 • b 2 ] 
a2 
(i) av2 (a,X,r3 )1aR = WR(r3 ,X)(l-r3 ) < 0 
a V 2 (a, X, s 3 ) I a R = W R ( s 3 , X) < 0 
( ii) 
2 2 dr3 
a V 2 ( a, X, r 3 ) I a R = W RR ( r 3 , X) ( 1-r 3 ) - dX 
[wR(r3 ,X)- WRX(r3 ,X)(l-r3 >J 
2 ds3 > 
a V 2 ( a, X, s 3 ) I a~ = W RR ( s 3 , X) + dX W RX { s 3 , X) < 0 
(iii) 
2 a V2 (a,X,r3 )1aXaR = WXR(r3 ,X) - WR(r3 ,X) > 0 







av2 (a.x.s3 )/aa = apWX(a.s3 ) 
flWx<a. s 3 > 
a2v2 (a.x. s3) . 2 a v2 (a.x. r3) 
= axac axac = 0 
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APPENDIX III 
Proof of Lemma 1: Taking the total derivatives of W(a1 .R)(1-a1





) = c. one gets 
da1 
= 1 > 0 dR Wx<a1 .R> (1-a) - W(a1 .R) 
and 
db1 
= 1 < 0 dR WX(b 1 .R)(1-b1 ) - W(b 1 .R) 
. 
The definition of the least and most ambitious acceptable targets and 
the concavity of W(X.R)(1-X) imply the needed result. 
Similarly. taking total derivatives again implies that 
and 










,X) - WR(a2 ,X) 
wx<a2 ,x> 
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where X is the new state of sponsor knowledge at the end of the 
research period. Thus r 2 > a2 and the assumption that WXR 2. 0 implies 
Furthermore a 2 2. X since by the definition of the instantaneous reward 
function W(X.R). X 2. R. 




-WXR(l-r2 ) + WR(r2 .X) 
wxx - 2wx 
A sufficient condition for 
dr




x2 = (J and therefore = o. dX 








if (J < (J2 
if (J 2. (J2 
p~ [w<z,X) - W(r2 ,X)(l-r2 l + c]dz 
(J2 
13~ [w<z.Xl if 
(J 
if 
Note that the top expression is always greater than or equal to the 




(a.X) with respect to a one gets 
0 
-p(l-a)WX(a.X) < 0 
if 
if 
As noted in the text. one need not consider the case of a < a
2 
since 
aT2 (a.X) * 
T2 <a2 .X) > c and aa < 0 are sufficient conditions for a 2 to be 




• Taking the total derivative of 








which has a sign opposite to WXR. 
* da2 
Therefore WXR l 0 implies dX i 0. 
Proof of Lemma s,: For the most ambitious acceptable target. taking 
the total derivative of 
c = 
db2 
one gets de = 1 A where 
db2 
Similarly dR = 




That --- < 0 and --- < 0 follows 
de dR 
directly from the definition of b
2 
and the quasiconcavity of (17) with 
respect to X. 





acceptable target and a2 > R. then de > 0 and dR > 0. 





, one knows that 




) > W(b 2 .R)(l-b2 ) which 




(R). A similar argument with respect to the 
least ambitious acceptable targets iplies that a2 (R) ~ a1 (R). 
Proof of Lemma 7: To establish the uniqueness of a
3 
one needs to 
analyze the behavior of 
av2 (a.x. x) 
which requires ( i) an understanding of laa for all X ~ a ~ 1 
and Xi xi 1, and (ii) proof of the claim that the only time a firm 
can be indifferent beween a risky vs a safe targeting strategy is when 
its optimal safe target reveals everything that it knows, i.e. 
av2 (a ,x. x) 
The properties of aa ,developed in O~(a,X) l 0 implies s 3 = a. 
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Appendix II. which together with (ii) imply the uniqueness of a 3 • 
include: 
( i) is an interior maximum, 
( ii) If r
3 
is a corner solution, i.e. r 3 = a. then 
a V 
2 
(a. x. x) 1-
a I < o . 
a I x=a 
(iii) If s
3 
is a corner solution then 
av2 <a.x. x> I+ 









Now proof of the claim requires that one show that the following 
properties are inconsistent. 
- ( i) 
oV2(a,R,x)l-
ax 1 < 0 
lx=a 
av 2 ( (J, R, x) I+ 
( ii) ax 1 > 0 
lx=a 
av2 (a,R, x) I 
(iii) ax 1 > 0 
lx=O 
R=O 
av2 (a,R, x) I 
( iv) ax I s_o 
lx=l 
( v) 
av2 (a,R, x) I 






ax I =O 
lx=s3 
I+ l-
v2<a.R.x>l < V2 (a.R.x)l lx=a lx=a 
(vii) 
Now (i) implies that 
and (ii) implies that 
But (i) and (ii) together imply that 
.-----
1 
ll t JlWR( z, a) dz] < WX(a ,X)( 1-a) < 
<12 
1 
- (1-a>PJ _ WR(z,a)dz , 
<12 
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which in turn implies that 
* a v 1 ( z, a , x2 ) 
oR dz + 
The first conradiction is that if WXR i 0 then 
-a(l-a)~WR(r2 ,a)(l-r2 l + ~ ~ WR(z,a)dz < 0 • A second contradiction 
r2 
which holds for WXR > 0 follows from the fact that 
0 < W(a,X) + ~W(r2 ,a)(l-r2 ) < -a(l-a)pWR(r2 ,a)(l-r2 ). However if 
W(r2 ,a) (1-r2 ) is concave in a, then W(r2 ,a) (1-r2 ) > aWR(r2 ,a> (1-r2 > 
since it is a well known result that f'(x)x < f(x) where f'(x) < 0 and 
f''(x) < 0. 
All that remains in the proof of Lemma 7 is to describe the 
comparative statics properties of a
3
• Taking the total derivative of 





WR(r3 ,X)(l-r3 ) - WR(a3 ,X) 




which is always positive if WXR l 0. 
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Similarly. again taking a total derivative and using Appendix 
II one gets 
[ av2 <~3 .x.x>l _ av2<a3.x.r3>] ac - ac lx=c
3 
de ----------------~---------------- ~ 0 
av2 (a3 .x. x) dxl 
ax da 1 -x=a3 
Proof of Lemma 8: Recall that~ is defined by the first order 
condition 
av2 <!!.3 .x. x> I 
ax I = o . 
lx=a -3 
Taking the total derivative. gives 
d!!,3 = 
dX 
a v 2 < !!.3 • x. s 3 > 
axaR 
a v 2 < !!.3 • x. s 3 > 
ax2 
which from Appendix II is always positive if V2 (a.X,x) is concave and 




2 -a v2 (a3 .x. s3) 
acax 
= 0 
2 a v 2 < !!.3 • x. s 3 > 
ax2 
0 
Proof of Lemma 9: Taking the total derivatives of 














dX > O. 
Similarly 
> 0 and WXR > 0 
""' ds3 
Again, if V2 (a,X,.x) is concave, WXR > 0 implies da > 0. 




dr3 = 0 
de 
= 





(a,X,.x) is strictly quasi-conoave with respect to x 
since it is the sum of a strictly concave function W(x,R), and a 
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* function V1 (a,x,x2 (x)) which is strictly decreasing in x. From 
Lemma 3 one knows that 
which implies from Appendix II that 
Therefore V2 (a,X,x) strictly quasi-concave implies r 3 (X) < r 2 (X). 








A r 0 V 1 ( z • <J • X2) 




(a,X,x) is concave 
> 0 • 
Since 
, for all a,X • 
This result implies that as the firms' planning horizon increases, the 
difference beween the value of an optimal risky vs safe program 
becomes less sensitive to the firm's level of private knowledge. This 
tends to make it more likely that a firm sets a risky target, (all 
other things equal) -- the longer the firms' planning horizon. In 
other words, 
implies that in going from a 2 to a 3 period R and D project, if 
a
3 
> 0, the set of values for a over which the firm will set a risk y 
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target, increases. However an ambiguity in the sign of [~3 ~2 ] 
evaluated at X = 0 arises because the magnitude of 
relative to 
I 
~(X, X) I 
IX=O 
is indeterminate. (See Figure Al) One must impose stronger 
conditions on the reward function to resolve this ambiguity. 
For exacple if 
I I 
Q3 (X. X) I 2. ~ (X. X) I 
lx=O lx=O 




(X) for all c, X. 
Proof of Lemma 11: 
Let T3(a,Xl = ~[v2 <z,x,s;l- V2(a,x,x;l ]dz. a 









da3 = 1 
oT3 (a3 ,X) . I . 
de oa 
2 a v2 <a.x,s3 >taxaR = 
• da3 




implied by aa > 0 . 
Next 
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Proof of Lemma 12: 
Recall that 
This can be rewritten as 
II t W( z,X)dz - ll (1-;;2 ) [IV( r 2 ,X) (1-r2 ) - c] 
a2 









which can be rewritten as 
ll t ll[v2<z.x,x;(z)) - V2 (a,X,r3 > ]dz if a< a3 
a3 
T3 (a,X) t p(v2 <z,X,z) ~ V2 (a,X,a) ]dz if a3 S.a s. 2:.3 a 





(1,X) = 0. Moreover if the firm's level of private 
knowledge, currently active target, and research costs are held 
constant. then 
i.e. the value of conducting new research when a firm has exhausted 
its inventory of private knowledge cannot decrease as the planning 
horizon increases. 
Taking the derivative of T
3
{a,X) with respect to private 
knowledge one gets 
0 
= 




a3 i a i sr,3 
a > 2:3 
* avl { z,a. x2 
oR dz L 0 
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) • = -af3Wx(a .. s 3.) a2 i. a < cr2 a a 
• -f3Wx<a .. s 3 ) a 2. a2 
1\ 
Define' as a threshhold values of a firm's discounting factor, where 
1\ o < II < 1. 
Suppose that a3 2. a2 • Then 
( i) • • a
3 
(X) > a2 (X) 
for all c sufficiently large. Also 
( ii) • a
3 
(X) • > a2 (X) 
for all X .. c is implied by 
which holds if WXR 2. 0 and 1 > f3 > ~. 
by 
Proof of Theorem 1: All parts of the induction are immediate from 
any analysis of t = 1_.2_.3 except part c(iii). For all t > 2 
avt_1 (a_.X .. st)~ 
ax IR=X 
= 0 • 
Therefore st+1 < st is implied by 
* * Consider a > at l ~t-1 • Note that 
and 
Then 
oV t-1 (a ,X, st+1 ) 
ax 
a V t-1 (a, X, s t+ 1 ) 
ax 
oV t-1 (a ,X, st+1 ) 
ax 
= 0 • 
If a l at_2 then 






By induction xt_1 > xt. Therefore WXR > 0 implies 
av t-1 (a ,x, st+1) 
ax > 0 • 
av t-1 (a,X, st+1 ) 
ax 
which is positive for WXR l 0. An analogous argument shows that 
• • xt_1 > xt and WXR l 0 implies rt+1 < rt. 
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CHAPTJ3)~ 4 
A I ·~ODEL OF R AND D ASSISTANCE DY A SPONSOR 
I. IN'IRODUCTION 
Over the last decade there has been concern among some 
scholars that the rate of innovation in key sectors of the U.S. 
economy is slowing down. 1 lligh income tax rates, overregulation, 
market failures, emphasis on less productive environmental and weapons 
research, and even diminishing returns to improvements in existing 
technologies have all been cited as potential culprits in a slow down 
of American innovation. 2 
Faced with higher research and marketing costs of new 
products, industry has looked to federal agencies, particularly DOD 
and NASA to fund an increasing share of the nation's industrial 
3 research and development. In addition Congress has provided federal 
agencies with the funds to accelerate socially useful innovations, 
where progress by the private sector is perceived to be too slow. 4 
However if government agencies and private research sponsors are to 
encourage industrial innovation, they must understand the impact upon 
private firms of alternative strategies for sponsoring research. 
This essay contributes to this need by modeling the influence 
of various types of research assistance on a firm's internal 
investment in a number of alternative research projects. Research 
'contracts' where the government sponsor is buying knowledge and/or 
technology for direct government use, and assistance relationships 
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with nonprofit organizations will not be considered here. 
II. mE MODEL 
It is useful to begin with a simple two period investment 
model which considers privately funded R and D, particularly applied 
research and engineering development, a risky but profit oriented 
activity. The model makes a number of simplifying assumptions about 
the nature of the research process and means of sponsorship which 
enables one to focus on the impact of alternative funding policies on 
a firm's commitment of private resources to a project. 
The manager or owner of a firm is assumed to have continuous 
subjective probability distributions conditional upon R and D funding 
levels which represent his/her beliefs about the future market value 
of a finite number of alternative research projects. The distribution 
functions, which represent the researcher's assessment of both 
technical and market uncertainty, are continuous, with first and 
second moments twice differentiable in the firm's research effort. In 
the first period the firm selects a level of research support for each 
project. In the second period the innovating firm conducts research 
and observes the realization of the random variable determining the 
value of an R and D venture. It then earns a return either by 
auctioning off proprietary rights, or marketing the innovation itself. 
Let Fi(n./R.) be the innovator's subjective probability distribution 
1 1 
function over the market · value of project i, conditional upon research 
expenditures R.. Second order stochastic dominance in R. is assumed 
1 1 
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which implies diminishing returns to the expected market 
value associated with increased research support. 5 
Furthermore let the owner of the firm be risk neutral 
regarding uncertainty over the future value of each project in the 
,firm's portfolio. This is consistent with the concept of self 
insurance through diversification. Additional assumptions implicit to 
the model include: 
Al. Research effort on project i does not affect the likelihood of 
success of project j, i.e. there are no externalities to 
research. 
ft2. Given any Rand D allocation the value of each project is 
stochastically independent across projects, that is, the 
technologies being developed by the firm are not close economic 
substitutes and macroeconomic correlations have been netted out 
of the profit distributions. 
A3. A finite number of projects can continuously absorb Rand D funds 
and new projects are not added to the firm's portfolio over the 
two period planning horizon. 
A4. When a firm participates in government sponsored research it does 
not destroy its proprietary position vis a vis a technology or 
research area targeted for government subsidy. In other words 
the detailed findings of a firm's research are not available to 
competitors without reimbursement of the firm. Therefore the 
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firm's probability distribution over the market value of an 
innovation does not shift because of the award of a grant by a 
sponsor. 
The assumption that participation in sponsored research does 
not damage a firm's proprietary position is less appropriate for 
government contract research. Here detailed information may be 
revealed to a sponsor who of ten assumes 0\'Tner ship rights, or reveals 
new public knowledge, thereby weakening a researcher's competitive 
position. In an assistance relationship, the sponsor only needs the 
details of a firm's research, to the extent that this information 
enables one to track the firm's research progress, audit expenditure, 
and efficiently award grants to promising projects. 
Despite the model's strong assumption about the nature of the 
research process and the institutional characteristics of sponsored 
research, it is a reasonable representation of government assistance 
programs which seek to encourage innovation through grants, tax 
credits. cost shared research, and other non-contractual subsidies of 
private research ventures. 
130 
Model 1 - Inelastic Supply of Research Funds 
It is useful to begin with a research firm that has a fixed 
research budget to allocate between k projects. Its objective in the 
first period is to allocate funds so as to maximize the total expected 
discounted value of its portfolio of research projects. 
( 1) 
Therefore, the manager 
( 1-Fi ( n. I R.) ) dn. 
1 1 1 
1 + r 
The logic of one is as follows: 
R.-R) 
1 
Ri = total research expenditures on project i, i=1, k and R. l 0. 
1 
n. = a random variable representing the market value of 
1 
project i in period 2. 
r = real discount rate, 0 < r < 1. 
Fi(n . /R.) =Cumulative probability distribution associated with 
1 1 
the market value of project i , which is 
conditional upon research expenditures R .• 
1 
A= Langrangian multiplier, A < 0. 
R =The firm's total research budget. 
The analytical form of the expectation, as it appears in 
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equation 1# is derived from a fundacental probability theorem obtained 
by integrating J:inidFi by parts, i.e., that the area between a 
cumulative distribution function and a unit constant function is the 
mean of the distribution. 
The first order conditions associated with an interior optimum 





• R. = 
1 
However if 
A. for all il j. 
R, where R~ is the optimal level of funding for the ith project. 
1 
• FR. (ni/Ri) dni < A. for all Ri > 0, then Ri = 0. 
1 
In otherwords, if the marginal expected value of spending a dollar 
more on a project is always less than the decrease in added value of 
not spending an additional dollar elsewhere, the firm should not fund 
the project. 
The first order conditions imply that the firm determines the 
best allocation of research funds, by equating marginal expected 
discounted values across projects. In addition, equations (2) and (3) 
are sufficient for a unique maximum, given the assumptions of 
diminishing returns and stochastic independence between projects. 
It is a straight forward comparative statics result 
that if the firm's total research budget is somehow 
increased from R to R' (perhaps because of an unexpected increase in 
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company sales or a general tax credit for research), all pr~jects 





If Ri > 0, dR 1 ) 0 for all i. 
This lemma follows from the assumption that FR.R~~i/Ri) ( O. 
l l 
Now that the basic model has been outlined, sponsored 
research, directed at specific projects, can be introduced by assuming 
that expenditures on a project come from two sources, one internal to 
a company (P.), and a subsidy (S.) provided by a sponsor. Of course 
1 1 
• R. = P. + S . • 
1 1 1 
Define P.(S.) to be the optimal level of private 
1 1 
funding for the ith project when the firm receives a vector of 
categorical grants from a sponsor s1 ••• Sk. Now in equation 1, Si = 0 
• • for all i, which implies that P.(O) = R., for, i=1,k, i.e. all 
1 1 
ventures are internally funded. 
Now suppose a sponsor decides to subsidize venture j by 
awarding a categorical grant, where the size of the grant is 
significantly less than the size of the firm's total research budget. 
Lemma 2 describes the firm's response to the grant. 
Lemma 2: 
• 
• dP . (S.) i) p. (0) i sj implies -1 < 1 1 < 0 J dS. 
J 
• 
• • dP . i i) p. (0) > 0, p. (0) > 0 implies 1 > ---1. > 0 for all i+j 
1 J dS. 
J 
iii) * p. (0) 
J 
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* 0 implies R. (S.) 
J J 
* dP. 
= S. and dS~ = 0 for all i~j. 
J J 
A categorical research grant to a project which would have received 
positive private funding. in any case. is likely to increase the total 
expenditures on the venture. but by less than the amount of the 
categorical grant. In addition all other projects which would have 
been funded in the absence of the grant will receive increased funding 
once the grant is awarded. 
However if a research venture would not be funded by a firm in 
the absence of a grant. a corner solution occurs. where the firm 
spends precisely the amount of the grant on the project targeted by 
the sponsor. 
In addition. the firm's level of effort on projects it 
considers viable for internal funding will not be affected by the 
award of a grant to a venture that the firm perceives as less cost 
effective at the margin. 
That Lemma 2 obtains can be seen by the fact that after a 
grant is awarded. planned research expenditures on project j become 
* P.(O) + S .• As a result the first order conditions no longer hold and 
J J 
a firm's internal funds are reallocated to the other k-1 projects. 
until a new equilibrium is restored. 
Before relaxing the assumption that the supply of capital for 
the firm's research budget is inelastic with respect to grants or 
interest rates. a further simplification of the model may be helpful 
for planning purposes. Suppose that the owner's subjective 
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probability distributions over the market value of each pro~ect, 
conditional upon research spending, are identical across projects. 
Then, as expected, the equilibrium allocation without government 
• subsidy is P.(O) = R/k for all i = l,k. A categorical grant awarded 
1 
to an individual project or alternatively a block grant for the same 
amount of money, awarded to the firm's total research budget, is 
divided equally among the k projects. 
Model 2 - Elastic Supply of Research Funds 
The first model assumed that the supply of private research 
funds was inelastic with respect to interest rates. This is 
consistent with the funding of a company's research division on the 
basis of an annual percentage of sales or profits. In addition, it 
was assumed that research grants fell as manna from heaven. and did 
not influence. nor were the grants influenced by, a firm's total 
internal R and D budget and allocation of funds between projects. 
These assumptions will now be relaxed. The research firm will be able 
to sell research and development bonds at the start of the first 
period and thereby privately fund its research by borrowing up to some 
R. These bonds plus an interest rate b will be payable at the end of 
the second period. after the random market value of all the firm's 




[1-Fi(n./P. + S.)] 







This gives the first order conditions 
(5) FRi (n./P. + S.) dn. = 
. 1 1 1 1 
1 
1+b i 1, k. 
Therefore, the firm borrows to finance its research portfolio until 
the expected marginal value of the least attractive project, i.e., the 
project to which the firm makes the smailest financial commitment, 
equals one plus the rate of interest on the bonds. Now let a sponsor 
award a categorical grant S. to project j. 
J 
* Again define P.(O) to be 
J 
the firm's optimal level of internal funding for a venture, when it 





i) If p. (0) 2. sj, then 






* ii) If p. (0) < s. then 1 1 = 0 and p. ( s.) = 0 





= 0 for all i=F j dS. 
J 
Lemma 3 suggests that a categorical grant awarded to a venture which 
would have been privately funded without a grant, at a level of effort 
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greater than or equal to the subsidy, is likely to encourag~ a 
complete substitution of public for private financing of research and 
development, conducted by the firm. In addition, the lemma suggests 
that it doesn't matter whether the grant is targeted at a specific 
project or simply supplements the firm's total research budget. The 
absolute level of spending on the research portfolio, and each 
individual project will be independent of the subsidy so long as the 
project being targeted for subsidy was perceived by the firm to be 
viable as a private venture. This result is robust under fairly 
general conditons, e.g., any class of continuous probability 
distributions that exhibit s~cond order stochastic dominance in 
research effort. It suggests that government efforts to accelerate 
innovations already being financed by the private sector may be in 
vain. 
The critical assumptions driving this analytical result are i) 
the firm fa~es a perfectly elastic supply of working capital and ii) 
diminishing returns in the research production function. 
Suppose there exists a lower range of research expenditures on 
a project such that diminishing returns is not valid. Certainly, a 
large corporation with a multi-million dollar research budget would 
not operate in such a range for economically viable projects. 
However, it can be argued that a small business or individual 
inventor, concentrating on one or two projects, may have insufficient 
resources to reach a scale of operations where diminishing returns to 
perceived research gains sets in. The firm or inventor may also find 
137 
private capital difficult and costly to raise. As a result, it has 
been suggested by policy makers that small businesses are excellent 
candidates for R and D assistance from a government sponsor. No 
doubt, under the conditions described above, government research 
gr~nts ~~ght actually increase private commitments to a research 
venture. 
It is also straight forward to show that if the firm's supply 
of working capital is upward sloping in interest rates (rather than 
perfectly elastic), a categorical grant will decrease total private 
expenditures on a project, but by less than the acount of the grant. 
Model 3 - Incentive Grants 
An alternative means of research sponsorship which may have 
certain advantages over lump sum categorical grants is based on the 
concept of matching funds. Cost sharing or matching funds formulas 
are utilized, particularly in assistance relationships with 
profit-oriented firms, where it is perceived by the sponsor that 
financial gains may flow to business over relatively short planning 
horizons. A simple matching funds relationship can be easily 
incorporated into the basic model. Let the firm 
( 6) maximize 
p 1• • .Pk 
[1-Fi(n./P. + a.(P.)P.)]dn. 






Here a(P.) is the proportion of private funds which will be matched by 
J 
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the sponsor. If the firm's internal support of the venture _j is P., 
J 
for every additional dollar spent by the firm, the sponsor awards 
a(P.) + a'(P.)P. > 0. The expressl.on a'(P.) refers to the first 
J J J - J 
derivative of the matching function a(P.). 
J 
The optimization leads to the first order condition 
(7) * * * ] (n./P . + a.(P.)P.) 
1 1 1 1 1 
[ , * * * ] 1 + a. (P. )P. + a. (P.) dn. 
1 1 1 1 1 1 
1+b for all i=1,k. 
, , 
A sufficient condition for a global maximum is that a. (P.) i 0 and 
1 1 , , 
* a..(P.) i o. However, even if a. (P.) > 0, P. is a maximum if 1 1 1 1 1 , , 
* * 
, 
* a. (P. )P. + 2a.(P.) < o. Of course, if a project does not receive 1 1 1 1 1 
matching funds the first order condition reduces to 
F i ( /P*)d = 
P 
n. . n. 
. 1 1 1 
(1+b). 
1 
Alternatively if the matching proportion is a constant for all levels 
of research support 
Fpi (n./P~ + aP~)(1 + a..)dn. = 
. 1 1 1 1 1 
1+b. 
1 
, * * * Also since 1 + a..(P.)P. + a.(P.) is independent of the 
1 1 1 1 1 
realization of the random variable, it can be removed from the 
integral, and placed on the right side of equation (6). Because 
, * * * 1 + a..(P.)P. + a..(P.) > 1 a matching funds formula has the affect of 
1 1 1 1 1 
subsidizing the interest rate the firm faces on individual projects, 
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without affecting the rest of the firm's portfolio. This e~courages 
the firm to increase its internal support of a venture preferred by a 
sponsor. 
III. CONCLUSION 
The impact of various forms of research sponsorship on a 
firm's internal investment in research ventures can be summarized with 
the aid of three diagrams. Figure 2 shows how a matching funds 
formula encourages increased private support of research at the 
margin, by lowering the interest rate faced on individual projects. 
Similarly, the impact of a categorical grant on a firm's 
internal investment in a research venture is illustrated in Figure 3, 
again, for the case of a perfectly elastic supply of working capital. 
Here a lump sum award shifts the research production possibility curve 
to the left, encouraging the firm to reduce internal funding of a 
project and rely on a subsidy to finance research progress. As a 
result the sponsor's attempt to 'push' a specific venture may be in 
vain. 
Finally, when a firm's total internal budget for all research 
ventures is fixed, categorical grants shift the research production 
possibility curve, up to the left. (See Figure 4.) However, there is 
less displacement of private funding in the constrained optimization 
than the unconstrained, where the supply curve for working capital was 
elastic. In addition, for every internal dollar not spen t en a 
project targeted for a subsidy, a dollar is reallocated to other 
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research projects considered viable by the firm. Thus while the 
sponsor's attempt to 'push' a specific innovation is not fully 
effective when categorical lump sum grants are awarded, research and 
development in general, is encouraged. 
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FIGURE 2 













INTERNAL FUNDING P. 
~ 
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